The Past, Present, and Future of the U.S. Electric Power Sector: Examining Regulatory Changes Using Multivariate Time Series Approaches by Binder, Kyle Edwin
  
 
 
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR: 
EXAMINING REGULATORY CHANGES USING MULTIVARIATE TIME SERIES 
APPROACHES 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
KYLE EDWIN BINDER  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Chair of Committee,  James W. Mjelde 
Committee Members, David A. Bessler 
 Richard T. Woodward 
 James M. Griffin 
Head of Department, C. Parr Rosson III 
 
May 2016 
 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
 
Copyright 2016 Kyle E. Binder
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. energy sector has undergone continuous change in the regulatory, 
technological, and market environments.  These developments show no signs of slowing.  
Accordingly, it is imperative that energy market regulators and participants develop a 
strong comprehension of market dynamics and the potential implications of their actions.  
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the past, present, and future of 
U.S. energy market dynamics and interactions with policy.  Advancements in 
multivariate time series analysis are employed in three related studies of the electric 
power sector.  Overall, results suggest that regulatory changes have had and will 
continue to have important implications for the electric power sector.  The sector, 
however, has exhibited adaptability to past regulatory changes and is projected to remain 
resilient in the future. 
  Tests for constancy of the long run parameters in a vector error correction model 
are applied to determine whether relationships among coal inventories in the electric 
power sector, input prices, output prices, and opportunity costs have remained constant 
over the past 38 years.  Two periods of instability are found, the first following railroad 
deregulation in the U.S. and the second corresponding to a number of major regulatory 
changes in the electric power and natural gas sectors.   
 Relationships among Renewable Energy Credit prices, electricity prices, and 
natural gas prices are estimated using a vector error correction model.  Results suggest 
that Renewable Energy Credit prices do not completely behave as previously theorized 
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in the literature.  Potential reasons for the divergence between theory and empirical 
evidence are the relative immaturity of current markets and continuous institutional 
intervention.   
 Potential impacts of future CO2 emissions reductions under the Clean Power Plan 
on economic and energy sector activity are estimated.  Conditional forecasts based on an 
outlined path for CO2 emissions are developed from a factor-augmented vector 
autoregressive model for a large dataset.  Unconditional and conditional forecasts are 
compared for U.S. industrial production, real personal income, and estimated factors.  
Results suggest that economic growth will be slower under the Clean Power Plan than it 
would otherwise; however, CO2 emissions reductions and economic growth can be 
achieved simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The U.S. energy sector is a popular subject of debate in the national media, the U.S. 
political arena, and the academic literature (Burtraw et al. 2014; Bushnell et al. 2015; 
McConnell 2015; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2015b).  This sector is 
continuously evolving in response to technology improvements, changing market 
conditions, and adjustments in the regulatory environment.  Major changes in the energy 
sector over the last three decades include (but are not limited to) market restructuring in 
both the natural gas and electricity sectors (U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) 2015a, 2015b), the beginning and end of a national emissions permit trading 
program (Evans and Woodward 2013), the introduction of state level Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy 2015), and a 
substantial increase in domestic crude oil and natural gas production resulting in 
considerable price decreases in these markets (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) 2015a).  Energy sector developments show no signs of slowing in the near future. 
 Given the importance of the U.S. energy sector to the domestic and global 
economies, it is crucial for policy makers and energy market participants to have a 
strong awareness of the potential implications of their actions.  The overall objective of 
this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of the past, present, and future 
of U.S. energy market dynamics and interactions with policy by: (1) characterizing 
market relationships and investigating the consequences of past regulatory changes and 
 2 
 
shifts in market conditions; (2) examining current program functionality; and (3) 
projecting the impacts of future policy implementation.  To achieve this broad objective, 
three related empirical investigations of issues in the electric power sector are conducted 
(Chapters II-IV), drawing on insights from advancements in multivariate time series 
analysis.   
Energy Market Relationships: Past Changes in Regulation and Market Conditions 
Economic relationships governing inventory behavior in the electric power sector are 
characterized in Chapter II.  Specific objectives are to determine how coal inventories at 
electric power plants are related to movements in various economic factors and to 
examine whether these relationships have remained constant over time in the face of 
aforementioned changes.  Monthly data spanning 38 years and encompassing numerous 
changes in the electricity and natural gas industries are used to estimate a vector error 
correction model.  This model allows for cointegration among coal inventories, input 
and output prices, and opportunity costs.  Tests for stability of the long run relationships 
among the variables are conducted following Hansen and Johansen (1999); the tests help 
to understand how inventory behavior of firms in the electric power sector changes when 
confronted with regulatory changes or shifts in market conditions.  Two sustained 
periods of instability are found: the first following deregulation of the U.S. railroad 
industry and the second following the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and 
coinciding with restructuring of both the natural gas and electricity industries.  Results 
suggest policy changes that alter the regulatory environment can result in considerable 
fluctuations in how firms‟ inventory decisions interact with input and output markets and 
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opportunity costs; however, the system is highly resilient as the long run relationships 
remain constant over approximately 68% of the 38 year sample period. 
Current Program Functionality 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, programs that require electricity suppliers to provide a 
minimum percentage of total sales from renewable energy, currently exist in the majority 
of U.S. states (Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy 2015).  Empirical 
analyses of tradable rights programs are necessary to determine if such programs are a 
move towards efficiency.  There is a lack of empirical analyses of RPS programs in the 
literature (Felder 2011; Fischer 2010).  This gap is addressed in Chapter III, with the 
objective of improving our understanding of the functionality of currently existing RPS 
programs.  This goal is accomplished by determining whether the dynamic relationships 
among Renewable Energy Credit (REC) prices in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 
natural gas prices, and electricity prices are consistent with economic theory.  As in the 
study characterizing inventory behavior, a vector error correction model is employed.  
Results indicate REC prices in the two states do not respond to shocks in electricity 
prices or natural gas prices as theorized in the literature.  Additionally, only weak 
evidence is found regarding whether REC prices are integrated across states.  Possible 
reasons for the divergence between theorized relationships and empirical evidence are 
the relative immaturity of the REC markets and continuous institutional intervention.  It 
appears that although Renewable Portfolio Standards have been promoted and 
implemented as market-based incentives for encouraging renewable generation, 
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regulators have not succeeded in creating an efficient, fundamental-driven market under 
current RPS programs in these two states. 
Projecting Impacts of Future Policy Implementation 
In Chapter IV, potential future impacts of a recently introduced national policy to reduce 
CO2 emissions from the electric power sector (the Clean Power Plan) are estimated using 
advancements in time series techniques for handling large datasets.  Factors extracted 
from a large number of monthly macroeconomic, financial, and energy related time 
series represent the underlying sources of variation in larger U.S. economic and energy 
sector activity.  These factors are included in a factor-augmented vector autoregressive 
model alongside three variables of interest: electric power sector CO2 emissions, U.S. 
industrial production, and U.S. real personal income.  Unconditional and conditional 
forecasts are compared for industrial production, real personal income, and the estimated 
factors.  The conditional forecasts are based on a constrained path of CO2 emissions 
reductions.  Results suggest that growth in economic activity will be slower under the 
Clean Power Plan than it would be otherwise, but that economic growth and CO2 
emissions reductions can be achieved simultaneously. 
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 CHAPTER II  
TESTING STABILITY IN THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR: CHARACTERIZING 
FUEL PRICE AND INVENTORY RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Energy markets in the U.S. have experienced several substantial changes in the last 
quarter century, including restructuring of both the natural gas and electricity industries.  
Additionally, the U.S. has seen a steady increase in natural gas supplies in recent years 
because of shale gas exploitation, leading to a decrease in prices.  Real monthly natural 
gas prices paid by electric power generators (October 2014 dollars) have dropped from a 
peak of $14.38/million BTU (mmBTU) in October 2005 to $3.06/mmBTU by 
September 2015 (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2015a).  In this 
changing environment, inventory management remains an essential function, having 
consequences for a company‟s profitability (Chen, Xue, and Yang 2013).    
Inventory decisions in the electric power sector are made in the presence of 
varying input prices and stochastic seasonal demands by using both spot market 
purchases and long-term contracts.  As noted, the energy sector has a history of 
regulatory changes and continues to be the subject of proposed regulation.  It is 
important, therefore, to understand how firms behave when faced with a changing 
regulatory environment or with major shifts in market conditions.  Jha (2015) motivates 
this importance; he finds that U.S. electric power plants which face deregulated 
electricity markets save approximately 3% per month in coal procurement and storage 
costs compared to regulated plants.  The objectives of this chapter are to determine how 
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coal stocks at electric power plants are related to movements in various economic factors 
and whether these relationships have remained constant over a period spanning several 
major events in the electricity industry, including market deregulation. 
To achieve these objectives, multivariate time-series techniques are employed, 
using five different U.S. aggregate monthly data series.  Previous literature and 
economic theory suggest that input inventory decisions are affected by input and output 
price expectations and opportunity costs (Jha 2015; Takriti, Supatgiat, and Wu 2001; 
Twisdale and Chu 1979).  Applying this intuition to the electric power industry suggests 
that coal inventories are expected to be related to fuel input prices, electricity (output) 
prices, and the opportunity cost of holding inventories.  Accordingly, two input costs to 
electric power plants are considered: coal and natural gas.  Coal and natural gas are the 
focus as they are the two largest fuel sources in the U.S. electric power sector.  In June 
2014, coal accounted for about 40% of total electricity generation; natural gas was the 
second largest source at 26% (U.S. EIA 2015a).  The third series is a measure of coal 
inventories at electric power plants.  Data for natural gas inventories are not included.  
Both the inherent dangers of natural gas storage and the ease in transportation cause 
natural gas to usually be stored within the gas sector and not the electric power sector.  
Electricity prices and Aaa corporate bond rates are included, representing output prices 
and opportunity costs.  Data are for the period July 1976 to October 2014.  Dynamic 
long run relationships between coal inventories and input and output prices in the 
electricity sector are presented.  To the author‟s knowledge, such coal relationships have 
not been examined in the literature.   
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Literature Review 
There is a relatively vast literature employing time-series methods to address issues in 
energy-related markets, as well as a large volume of literature on inventory control.  A 
non-exhaustive list of inventory behavior literature dates back to Arrow, Harris, and 
Marschak (1951), and includes works such as Holt, Modigliani, and Simon (1955), 
Feldstein et al. (1976), and Blinder (1986).  Generally, inventory studies focus on the 
determination of optimal stocking levels of goods.  The present study takes a different 
approach by studying the dynamic long run relationships between input inventory levels 
and input and output prices in the electricity sector.   
While inventory literature contains many studies of optimal finished goods 
levels, little attention has been given to the optimal stocking of inputs (raw or 
intermediate goods).  Ramey (1989) develops an optimization method for inventories at 
different stages of production.  She shows that input inventories are much more volatile 
than output inventories.  The theory introduced was a major departure from past 
inventory literature, as she treated inventories as a factor of production, rather than a 
stage between production and sale of goods.  Humpreys, Maccini, and Schuh (2001) 
note that Ramey‟s approach to modeling input inventories implies that optimal stocking 
rates stem from factor demand theory.  They argue that Ramey‟s approach does not 
properly capture the flow of inputs in the production process, i.e. the benefits and costs 
from holding inventories of raw and intermediate goods.  Humphreys, Maccini, and 
Schuh (2001) provide a model for inventory management which includes ordering, 
usage, and stocking of inputs in the durable and nondurable goods industries.  Their 
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model shows that input inventories respond positively to sales and negatively to raw 
material price shocks.  Considine (1997) uses a model which simultaneously determines 
input and output inventories to investigate the determinants of each in the petroleum 
refining industry.  He finds that the elasticity of crude oil stocks with respect to a basket 
of energy and material prices is small and negative in both the short and long run. 
There are a small number of studies addressing fuel inventory and purchase 
decisions in the electric power industry.  Jha (2015) estimates a dynamic, plant-level 
model for optimal coal purchases at coal-fired electric power plants.  He finds that firms 
which face wholesale market electricity prices save roughly 3% per month in coal 
purchase and storage costs compared to a firm under output price regulation.  Twisdale 
and Chu (1979) develop a multiperiod, dynamic programming framework in which they 
study optimal coal inventory management.  They find that coal purchases tend to follow 
a seasonal, sawtooth pattern from month to month.  Sensitivity analyses show that 
potential replacement costs (the cost to replace power when the plant is short on coal) 
and/or revenue losses greatly affect the optimal strategy.  Takriti, Supatgiat, and Wu 
(2001) study the problem of a natural gas power plant‟s fuel purchase decision under 
uncertainty of natural gas prices, electricity prices, and natural gas demand. They 
propose a mixed integer programming approach to inform the decision maker when to 
buy or sell natural gas, and when to burn natural gas to produce electricity under 
stochastic scenarios.  They find that their stochastic model outperforms a deterministic 
alternative by a factor of three to four percent. 
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Applications of multivariate time-series techniques to the energy sector are 
prevalent in the literature.  Most of these studies pertain to energy price relationships, 
but a few studies address the relationships between management decisions and economic 
variables.  One such study is Considine and Heo (2000), who investigate relationships in 
petroleum prices, inventories, production, and net imports.  They find that under periods 
of high prices, oil refiners reduce crude oil stocks but increase finished product 
inventories.  Pindyck (2001) develops an explanation for how prices, production, and 
inventory levels of commodities are related to each other.  He shows that price volatility 
is important in driving the dynamics of storage markets.  In a related paper, Pindyck 
(2004) argues that higher volatility in petroleum markets increases the demand for 
inventories, as inventories are meant to be a smoothing mechanism.  He specifies a 
model for petroleum product prices, inventories, and volatility, and finds that while price 
volatility does influence inventory levels, it is to a lesser extent than expected. 
Applications of time series techniques to input and output price data from the 
energy sector provide a starting point for the current study.  Borenstein and Shepard 
(2002) use time series methods to explore the dynamics between crude oil prices and 
wholesale gasoline prices using a model in which holding inventories is costly.  They 
discover that wholesale gasoline (output) price has a lagged response to shocks in crude 
oil price (input cost).  Panagiotidis and Rutledge (2007) test the hypothesis of 
decoupling of natural gas and oil prices in the UK.  They find a cointegrating 
relationship between natural gas and oil prices, providing evidence against the 
hypothesis of decoupling of the markets.  Mohammadi (2009) and Mjelde and Bessler 
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(2009) both use vector error correction models to examine long run relationships 
between electricity prices and major fuel markets.  Mohammadi (2009) finds a 
relationship between coal prices and electricity prices in the long run.  Mjelde and 
Bessler (2009), using four major fuel source prices and two different electricity markets 
within the United States, conclude that the largest responses in electricity prices 
generally come from shocks in the coal market.  They conclude that price discovery is 
found in the fuel source markets.  
Data 
Data used in the empirical analysis includes national level monthly observations of 
seven different series for the period July 1976 to October 2014, giving a total of 459 
observations.  Five endogenous series are: cost of coal and natural gas receipts at electric 
generating plants
1
 (representing input prices); electricity prices (output prices); coal 
inventories (input stocks); and Moody‟s Aaa Corporate Bond ratings (opportunity costs).  
The four energy series are from the EIA‟s Monthly Energy Review (U.S. EIA 2015a).  
Coal inventory is constructed by dividing the amount of coal on hand at electric power 
plants in a given month by the previous month‟s consumption of coal, thereby 
approximating the number of months of coal on hand at electric power plants.
2
  The 
Moody‟s data are from the U.S. Federal Reserve (2015).   Additionally, cooling degree 
                                                 
1
 These series are from Table 9.9 “Cost of Fossil-Fuel Receipts at Electric Generating Plants” of the 
Monthly Energy Review (U.S. EIA 2015a) and are referred to as coal and natural gas costs throughout this 
chapter. 
2
 As a robustness check, the empirical analysis was carried out for an alternative measure of coal 
inventory: current end-of-month coal on hand divided by the following month‟s consumption in the 
previous year, i.e.            
             
                    
.  The test for parameter stability is robust to this 
alternative measure (Appendix A). 
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days and heating degree days are treated as exogenous series.  Cooling and heating 
degree days are national level, population weighted monthly observations from the U.S. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2015).  All five endogenous series 
are converted to October 2014 dollars using the Producer Price Index (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2015).    
The electricity price series is constructed from two different series.  Pre-2001 
electricity prices are average U.S. retail electricity prices, whereas after December 2000 
wholesale prices are used.  January 2001 is the first month in which sufficient data are 
available on deregulated wholesale electricity prices to generate a U.S. national price.  
Wholesale prices are the preferred measure because of their relevance as the price that 
power plants receive for their product.  Retail prices are included as they are tied to the 
price received by plants; however, they are less volatile than wholesale prices.  The 
monthly average retail price comes from U.S. EIA (2015a).  The wholesale price was 
constructed as a weighted average using EIA price and volume data (U.S. EIA 2015b) 
from four major U.S. hubs (PJM West, Mid-Columbia, Palo Verde, and New England – 
Massachusetts).  Because of the nature of the electricity price series, a 0-1 dummy 
variable (equal to one pre-2001 and zero after) to account for the difference in the series 
is included in the model following suggestions by Juselius (2006) and Estima (2006) to 
handle a known break.   
All endogenous series are in natural logarithm form for the analysis.  The 
endogenous series are abbreviated as follows: real coal costs to electric power plants 
(Coal), real natural gas costs to electric power plants (NG), coal inventories at electric 
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power plants (Coal Inv), Aaa corporate bond rates (Bonds), and real electricity prices 
(Elec).  Graphs of the five endogenous (before taking natural logarithms) and two 
exogenous series are presented in figure 2.1.  
Methodology 
Previous studies have shown that economic variables in the electricity sector tend to be 
integrated in the long run, confirming economic theory (Mjelde and Bessler 2009; 
Samuelson 1971).  An appropriate dynamic modeling technique to capture both short 
and long run relationships is the vector error correction model (VECM).  The VECM 
framework affords the opportunity to model long run relationships by allowing for the 
existence of cointegration among a set of non-stationary variables (Juselius 2006).  
Cointegration is present when there exists a linear combination of two or more non-
stationary variables which is itself stationary (the series are thought to move together in 
the long run).
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Figure 2.1. Data series (monthly) included in the analysis (July 1976-October 2014).   
Units: Coal and natural gas costs ($/mmBtu), electricity prices ($/MWh), coal 
inventories (number of coal months on hand) 
 
 
It is important, therefore, to first test whether each of the five endogenous series is 
stationary.  Three separate tests for stationarity are reported in table 2.1.  Under the first 
test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Fuller 1996), the null hypothesis of a unit root (non-
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stationarity) cannot be rejected for the natural logarithm of each of the five series.  
Taking the first difference of the natural logs leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis 
for each of the five series, implying that the series are non-stationary in natural logarithm 
of levels, but the first difference natural log transformation leads to stationarity.  The 
second test (Z-A) examines the null hypothesis of a unit root while allowing for an 
unknown breakpoint in both the intercept and linear trend of the series (Zivot and 
Andrews 1992).  The null hypothesis is again rejected for the natural log of all series, but 
cannot be rejected for the first difference natural logs of all series except coal costs.  The 
third test, KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), results in a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
stationarity for all series in natural logs.  The null of stationarity is not able to be rejected 
for the first difference natural logs of all five series.  Taking the results of the three tests 
together, it appears that the natural log of all series are integrated of order one, or     , 
providing statistical credence of the potential for cointegration and the use of the VECM 
framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
Table 2.1. Various Tests for Unit Root 
 ADF (  : Unit Root) Z-A (  : Unit Root) KPSS (  : 
Stationarity) 
 Statistic Decision
a 
Statistic Decision
b 
Statistic Decision
c 
log(Series) 
Coal  -1.38 F -3.79 F 4.48 R 
NG -1.84 F -3.51 F 1.14 R 
Coal Inv -1.30 F -3.79 F 4.24 R 
Bonds -0.22 F -4.80 F 6.54 R 
Elec -0.40 F -3.31 F 5.36 R 
diff(log(Series) 
Coal  -3.74 R -4.85 F 0.39 F 
NG -5.03 R -6.00 R 0.05 F 
Coal Inv -5.49 R -6.56 R 0.05 F 
Bonds -5.72 R -6.68 R 0.16 F 
Elec -5.35 R -6.38 R 0.06 F 
a
Based on the 5% critical value of -2.87 
b
Based on the 5% critical value of -5.08 
c
Based on the 5% critical value of 0.46 
 
 
 
Vector Error Correction Model 
Given the results of the tests for stationarity along with the findings of previous studies 
which show the existence of long run relationships among the endogenous series, it is 
appropriate to use the VECM representation:  
(2.1)              ∑                       
   
                  
where:  
       is a       vector of first differences of the endogenous series; 
     is a       vector of constants; 
         represents lagged values of order  ; 
      is the corresponding       coefficient matrix; 
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     is the optimal number of lags in a levels vector autoregressive representation; 
      is a       vector of exogenous series (cooling and heating degree days, and a 0-1 
   qualitative variable to capture retail-wholesale electricity price differences); 
     is a       coefficient matrix; 
      is a       vector of innovations; and 
         is known as the “error correction” term, where   is       vector of 
   coefficients and      is      . 
Writing   as: 
(2.2)                     
where   and   are both       matrices gives an interpretation of the long run 
relationships among the five series and where   is the rank of   .  Because      is non-
stationary and     is stationary,     contains stationary linear combination(s) of the five 
variables, provided cointegration is present.  The   columns of   are known as the 
cointegrating vectors (Tsay 2014).  Statistical tests are performed on  ,  , and   to 
determine   and to further characterize the long run structure between the five series.   
Test of Parameter Stability 
To address the issue of stability of the long run relationships, a test for constancy of   is 
conducted following Hansen and Johansen (1999).  The test is performed by recursively 
estimating the VECM for subsamples of the data spanning from    to 
                   where   is the full sample,    is the time of the first observation, 
and    is the starting point of the recursion chosen to allow a minimal base sample as a 
function of the number of parameters in the model (        .  To test the constancy 
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of  , estimates  ̂    are compared to  ̂   , where  ̂    is the estimate of   for the 
subsample including data up until time  .  Define: 
(2.3)       [ ̂
   
 
]  ,     [
 ̂ 
   
 
  
] ,   ̅                                                                             
where    is the orthogonal complement of   such that   
     (likewise for  ̂ 
   
).    ̂    
is normalized on  ̅ such that  ̂ 
   
  ̂     ̅  ̂      .  Additionally, define  ̂ 
   
 
 ̂    ̂     ̅  such that  ̂ 
   
 ̂ 
   
   ̂    ̂    .  Then the test statistic at each point in the 
sample   is: 
(2.4)       
   
 (
 
 
)
 
     {                         }                                                                         
where: 
(2.5)           ̂   (    ̂
   )
  
;                                          
(2.6)         (
 
 
)           ; and        
(2.7)                 
     ̂ 
    ̂ 
       
       ̂       ̂ 
   
.     
   
   
 is the product moment matrix of residuals from the VECM using the sample up until 
time  ,  ̂    is the diagonal matrix of the   largest eigenvalues corresponding to the   
estimated cointegrating vectors from the full sample, and  ̂    is the covariance matrix 
of innovations based on the full sample (Hansen and Johansen 1999). 
By examining the sequence of test statistics   
   
, a test of whether  ̂     ̂   for 
each                    is performed (null hypothesis at each  ).  For a thorough 
 18 
 
explanation of the test and the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic   
   
, see 
Hansen and Johansen (1999), Juselius (2006), and the CATS 2.0 Manual (Estima, 2006). 
Innovation Accounting Procedures 
Impulse response functions (IRFs) and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) 
help to characterize the dynamic relationships among coal inventories, coal and natural 
gas costs, electricity prices, and Aaa corporate bond rates.  IRFs show the effect of a 
one-time shock in one variable on the future values of the remaining variables, and 
FEVDs are calculated as the percentage of variance in forecast error in one variable that 
can be explained by unexpected shocks to the other variables. 
Innovation accounting procedures (IRFs and FEVDs) are conducted based on the 
levels vector autoregressive (VAR) form of the VECM in equation (2.1): 
(2.8)                       ∑                                 
   
   .             
An issue that arises when conducting innovation accounting procedures is that the 
contemporaneous covariance matrix of    in Equation (2.8),   , is usually not a diagonal 
matrix in empirical applications (the components of the error term are 
contemporaneously correlated).  If this is the case, then any particular series cannot 
necessarily be shocked without affecting another series; innovation accounting 
procedures are nonsensical if contemporaneous correlation exists (Tsay 2014).  To 
overcome this limitation, the innovations    must be orthogonalized.  Consider a 
Bernanke (1986) ordering, where the correlated innovations    are written as a function 
of the underlying (structural) sources of variation (  ) which are assumed to be 
orthogonal: 
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(2.9)         
     .          
To conduct the innovation accounting procedures, the VAR representation (equation 2.8) 
is pre-multiplied by the matrix  . 
A form for the matrix   is obtained through causal flow methods (Pearl 2000; 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines. 2000).  Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) provide a 
visual summary of contemporaneous causal flows among innovations from the estimated 
vector error correction model.  The GES algorithm (Chickering 2003) in TETRAD V 
(2015) is employed to generate DAGs using the covariance matrix of error terms.  In 
DAGs, an arrow from A to B implies that A causes B.  An undirected line from A to B 
with no arrow (or a line with an arrow on each end) signifies flows between the two, but 
the algorithm cannot determine whether A causes B or B causes A.  If there is no 
information flow between A and B, the algorithm will not generate a line of any type 
connecting the two.  The GES algorithm starts from a DAG representation where all 
variables are independent of each other (no lines), and searches over more complicated 
representations for improvements in the Bayesian Information Criterion.  The algorithm 
picks the DAG representation such that no added line or change of direction improves 
the criterion. 
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Results 
Model Diagnostics for the Full Model 
The first step in the modeling procedure is to estimate the VECM representation in 
equation (2.1).  First, in accordance with Hansen and Johansen (1999), the constant term 
  is restricted such that no deterministic trend is allowed in the model (the constant is 
constrained to the cointegrating space).  Next, under the restricted constant model, 
simultaneous determination of optimal lag length ( ) and cointegrating rank (   using 
information criteria is performed following Wang and Bessler (2005).  Results of this 
process are reported in table 2.2.  The Hannan and Quinn loss metric reaches a minimum 
value at two lags and three cointegrating vectors. 
 
 
Table 2.2. Results of Simultaneous Determination of   and   Following Wang and 
Bessler (2005), Using the Hannan and Quinn M Loss Metric 
   (cointegrating rank) 
   (lags) 1 2 3 4 5 
 1 -31.12 -31.17 -31.19 -31.17 -31.15 
 2 -31.23 -31.25 -31.26 -31.24 -31.21 
 3 -31.20 -31.19 -31.19 -31.16 -31.13 
 4 -31.08 -31.08 -31.06 -31.03 -30.99 
 5 -30.98 -30.97 -30.95 -30.92 -30.88 
 6 -30.85 -30.83 -30.81 -30.77 -30.74 
 7 -30.63 -30.60 -30.57 -30.54 -30.51 
 8 -30.44 -30.40 -30.37 -30.34 -30.30 
 9 -30.34 -30.31 -30.28 -30.24 -30.22 
 10 -30.13 -30.11 -30.08 -30.04 -30.01 
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There are a suite of tests available to further examine the cointegrating space.  
Results of these tests are reported in table 2.3.  The null hypothesis of the variable 
stationarity test is that one or more of the cointegrating vectors does not represent a 
linear combination of non-stationary series, but rather arises because one of the series is 
stationary given the optimal lag length and cointegrating rank of the VECM.  This 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for all series.  The second test is for variable 
exclusion, which tests the null hypothesis that a particular series is not a part of the 
cointegrating space.  The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for all five 
endogenous series.  Lastly, the test for weak exogeneity examines whether a variable 
responds to disruptions to the long run relationships characterizing the data.  The null 
hypothesis of weak exogeneity is rejected at the 5% level for all five endogenous series.  
These three tests suggest that cointegration exists, all endogenous series are included in 
the cointegrating space, and all series respond to shocks in the system. 
 
Table 2.3. Test for Variable Exclusion, Stationarity, and Weak Exogeneity for the 
Full Sample Period. P-values in Parentheses 
Test Coal NG Coal Inv Bonds Elec 
Stationarity 34.17 
(0.00) 
11.00 
(0.05) 
34.79 
(0.00) 
34.15 
(0.00) 
35.21 
(0.00) 
Exclusion 19.71 
(0.00) 
22.11 
(0.00) 
31.22 
(0.00) 
16.42 
(0.00) 
36.94 
(0.00) 
Weak Exogeneity 25.41 
(0.00) 
12.04 
(0.01) 
30.00 
(0.00) 
9.24   
(0.03) 
35.83 
(0.00) 
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Testing Constancy of   
As Hansen and Johansen (1999) note, the test of parameter constancy outlined above 
does not require any additional restrictions for identification of  .  The sequence of test 
statistics   
   
 for each                   , therefore, is calculated recursively for the 
VECM with two lags and three cointegrating vectors.  The minimum    allowable given 
the number of parameters in the model is April 1980, thus, the base sample for the 
recursive estimation is September 1977 to April 1980.  Each successive estimation in the 
recursive process can be done in one of two ways, either by re-estimating all parameters 
in the model in each step (referred to as the X-Form) or by re-estimating   and   while 
holding the short-run parameters fixed (R1-Form).  The series of test statistics   
   
 are 
reported for both forms in figure 2.2.  By construction, the sequence converges to zero at 
the end of the sample. 
Estimates of   ̂    are not constant over the entire sample for both the X- and R1-
Forms, suggesting the long run relationships among coal inventories, coal and natural 
gas costs, electricity prices, and Aaa bond rates contain some degree of instability.  The 
X-Form displays a period of instability from mid-1994 to mid-2001 as   
   
 exceeds the 
critical value during this period, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter 
constancy.  The R1-Form contains the same period of instability, but also shows some 
instability near the beginning of the sample (mid-1981 to mid-1986).   
A timeline of major developments related to the U.S. electricity generating 
process during the sample period is presented in table 2.4.  The first major event in the 
sample was the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which lifted constraints on the railroad 
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industry and allowed railroad operators more flexibility in pricing and delivery (U.S. 
Federal Railroad Administration 2011).  This flexibility had implications for coal 
inventory decisions in the electricity industry, as the majority of coal is transported by 
rail.  The initial period of instability in the R1-Form begins roughly 10 months after the 
Staggers Rail Act was signed into law.  Wilson (1994) estimates the effects of the 
Staggers Act on rail rates for a number of commodities.  He finds that the law initially 
increased rail rates for coal, but by 1988 the effect of regulation had reversed.  In 
addition, Dennis (2000) shows that coal-related rate reductions were an important factor 
in explaining the large overall rate reduction seen by the railroad industry in the 16 years 
following the Staggers Act.  It is possible that the instability shown in the R1-Form, 
which holds the short-run VECM parameters fixed, is reflective of the effects of policy 
changes in the railroad industry. 
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Figure 2.2.  Results of test for constancy of   following Hansen and Johansen (1999) for VECM with     and    .  
The null hypothesis at each   is that  ̂     ̂   .  The 5% critical value for the test is 4.17. 
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Table 2.4. Timeline of Major Events Pertaining to the Electric Power and Natural 
Gas Sectors 
Date Event Description 
10/14/80 Staggers Rail Act Deregulation of U.S. railroad services 
   
11/15/90 Clean Air Act 
Amendments 
Promotes use of low-sulfur coal and 
natural gas. Establishes SO2 permit trading 
program. 
   
   
4/8/92 FERC Order 636 Unbundling of sales from transportation 
services in natural gas industry 
   
10/24/92 Energy Policy Act Goals for increasing clean energy use and 
improving energy efficiency 
   
1/1/94 NAFTA Trilateral trade agreement between U.S., 
Mexico, and Canada 
   
4/24/96 FERC Order 888 Promotes competition in U.S. electricity 
sector 
   
12/11/97 Kyoto Protocol International agreement to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 
   
12/20/99 FERC Order 2000 Advances formation of RTOs 
   
8/8/05 Energy Policy Act Authorizes subsidies for clean energy 
sources, promotes clean coal initiatives 
   
Aug-Sep. 
„05 
Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita 
Major disruptions in U.S. Gulf state natural 
gas and petroleum infrastructure 
   
‟07-„08 Onset of U.S. shale gas 
boom 
Natural gas supply increase and subsequent 
decrease in price 
   
7/6/11 Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule 
State level caps on SO2 emissions; national 
cap from ‟90 Clean Air Act Amendments 
no longer binding
1 
1
See Evans and Woodward (2013) for a detailed discussion regarding the 1990 Clean Air 
Act Amendments. 
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The second period (mid-1994 to mid-2001) of parameter instability (present in 
both the X- and R1-Forms) corresponds to the implementation of several regulatory 
measures directly related to the electric power industry.  In November of 1990, a new set 
of amendments to the U.S. Clean Air Act were signed into law.  The new amendments 
encouraged reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions (among other toxics) by establishing 
emissions trading programs and by promoting the use of low sulfur coal and natural gas 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2015a).  One and a half years later, in April 
1992, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 636, 
which unbundled sales and transportation services in the natural gas industry, creating a 
new level of competition in the marketplace (U.S. FERC 2015a).  The second period of 
parameter instability begins about two years after Order No. 636, in 1994.  In April 
1996, FERC passed Order No. 888, which intended to promote competition in wholesale 
electricity markets (U.S. FERC 2015b).  FERC passed Order No. 2000 in December 
1999, encouraging participation in wholesale electricity markets by advancing the 
creation of Regional Transmission Organizations (U.S. FERC 2015c).  The second 
period of instability ends approximately a year and a half afterward, in mid-2001.  Given 
the results of the test displayed in figure 2.2, it is possible that this era of regulatory 
action in the U.S. electricity sector caused disruptions in the long run relationships 
characterizing inventory behavior, input and output prices, and opportunity costs in the 
electricity industry. 
Constancy is present in the estimates of  ̂    after mid-2001.  There is a spike in 
  
   
 around mid-2008, which approximately corresponds to the onset of the U.S. shale 
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gas boom.  The test statistics, however, do not reach the rejection region.  This result 
suggests that the U.S. shale gas boom did not coincide with the same level of instability 
in the long run relationship as that of the regulatory environment of the 1990s. 
Testing Constancy of   in Subsets of the Variables 
To further investigate the possible sources of the parameter instability uncovered in the 
previous sub-section, VECMs are estimated for the 26 potential subsets of the five 
endogenous variables (exogenous variables are included in each model).  Each VECM is 
specified following the simultaneous determination procedure described above.  The 
same test for constancy of   following Hansen and Johansen (1999) is carried out for 
each of the 26 models.  For brevity, only a few results are discussed in the text.  Graphs 
of the test statistics for all 26 models are in Appendix A. 
In all possible four-variable model combinations which contain both coal 
inventory and coal costs, a similar pattern of rejection of constancy is present in the 
beginning of the sample.  As in the full model, the R1-Form of the test statistic rejects 
constancy during the period mid-1981to mid-1986.  Conversely, the four-variable model 
omitting coal costs (containing coal inventory, natural gas costs, electricity price, and 
bonds) does not exhibit rejection in this initial period.  A similar result is found in the 
four-variable model in which coal inventory is omitted.  These findings suggest that the 
initial period of parameter instability in the full model may be attributed to occurrences 
in the coal inventory series, the coal cost series, or the relationship(s) between them.  
This evidence aligns with the proposition that the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 may be 
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influencing the initial period of instability in the long run relationships; the coal market 
was likely affected more by this act than the natural gas or wholesale electricity markets. 
A second pattern emerges from examining the 26 models.  In all models which 
contain both natural gas cost and electricity price, the second period of parameter 
instability appears (mid-1994 to mid-2001).  In the 18 models which omit one or both of 
the natural gas and electricity price series, this period of rejection does not occur except 
in three cases (in these three cases, the period of rejection is shorter and the test statistic 
is only slightly above the critical value).  Of the three cases where a period of rejection 
occurs, electricity price appears in two and natural gas cost is included in the third.  This 
result is consistent with the idea that deregulation of both the natural gas and electricity 
markets might have contributed to the second period of instability in the long run 
relationships.  Duangnate (2015), who investigates the stability of long run relationships 
among eight North American daily natural gas spot markets, finds three periods of 
instability, one from approximately 1996 to 2000.  These findings are compatible with 
that of the current study; the natural gas market may be a source of instability in the long 
run relationships across the coal inventory, coal and natural gas costs, electricity price, 
and bond market relationships. 
A third period of rejection (2007-2009) is present in some of the models, roughly 
coinciding with the onset of the U.S. shale gas boom.  This period of instability appears 
in models which include natural gas and electricity price.  Because the shale gas boom 
affected natural gas prices, which in turn may have affected electricity prices, this 
finding is not surprising.  This period of rejection is generally not present in models 
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which include both the coal inventory and bonds series, suggesting that inventory may 
have been acting as a smoothing mechanism.  This inference is consistent with the 
economic theory of inventory management. 
Innovation Accounting in Three Subperiods 
Given the results of the tests for parameter constancy in the full model, it is instructive to 
break the data into three subperiods.  Tests for variable exclusion, stationarity, and weak 
exogeneity are carried out for each subperiod.  Impulse response functions (IRFs) and 
forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) are computed separately for each 
subperiod and compared to examine how the relationships between coal inventory and 
input, output, and opportunity costs have changed over time.  
The three subperiods for which the analysis is implemented, based on the test 
results displayed in figure 2.2, are: July 1976 to September 1993, October 1993 to 
December 2001, and January 2002 to October 2014.  As outlined above, the middle 
period (October 1993 to December 2001) is wholly characterized by long run parameter 
instability, possibly brought on by the introduction and continued alterations of new 
policies in the energy industry.  For each of these three subperiods, a VECM is specified 
and fit to the data.  Results of tests for variable exclusion, stationarity, and weak 
exogeneity for each of the three subperiods are in table 2.5.  All three hypotheses are 
rejected for the coal inventory series in the first two subperiods.  In the third subperiod, 
the hypotheses of exclusion and weak exogeneity of coal inventory are unable to be 
rejected, suggesting that coal inventories are not part of the cointegrating space and do 
not respond to shocks in the system during this subperiod (January 2002 – October 
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2014).  This finding provides further evidence that inventory behavior was likely 
affected by the changing policy landscape of the 1990s, but was fairly stable over more 
recent market developments (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and the onset of the 
U.S. shale gas boom in the mid-to-late 2000s).   
DAGs for each of the three subperiods are presented in figures 2.3-2.5.  The first 
subperiod exhibits contemporaneous causal flows from coal, natural gas, and electricity 
prices to coal inventories, and from Aaa corporate bond rates to electricity prices.  In the 
second subperiod, the flows from coal costs and electricity prices to coal inventories are 
not present.  The DAG for the third subperiod differs from the first two.  
Contemporaneous flows exist from bond rates to coal inventories (this is not the case in 
either of the first two subperiods).  Additionally, there are flows from coal inventories 
and coal costs to natural gas costs, and from natural gas costs to electricity prices.   
IRFs, which show the effect of a one-time shock in one variable on the future 
values of the remaining variables, are displayed for each of the three subperiods in 
figures 2.6-2.8.
3
  The responses of coal inventory to the four economic factors are 
generally unchanged across the three subperiods.  Coal inventories respond negatively to 
shocks in natural gas costs in all three subperiods and negatively to electricity price 
shocks in the first and third subperiods.  During the second subperiod, however, the 
response of coal inventories to shocks in electricity price is minimal.  Recall that the 
second subperiod contains numerous regulatory shifts in the electricity industry.  It is 
                                                 
3
 The IRFs are standardized by dividing through by the standard error of innovations for each series. 
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possible that power plants were less willing to adjust their inventory schedules according 
to electricity price fluctuations during this period of regulatory change. 
Coal inventories respond positively to shocks in coal costs in all three 
subperiods; the largest response is in the first subperiod.  The first subperiod contains the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980; it is likely that power plants adjusted inventories after seeing 
the effects of the Act on coal rates.  Another interesting takeaway from the IRF analysis 
is that coal inventories respond positively to shocks in Aaa corporate bond rates in all 
three subperiods.   
The IRFs concerning relationships among the non-inventory variables are 
generally consistent across subperiods; several results are noted here.  The first is that 
coal and natural gas costs both respond negatively to shocks in electricity price during 
the second subperiod, which might be the result of adjustment to electricity market 
restructuring during the period.  Electricity prices show a relatively strong positive 
response to natural gas cost shocks in the third subperiod, which contains the U.S. shale 
gas boom (a large increase in domestic natural gas supply). 
Forecast error variance decompositions show the percentage of variance in 
forecast error for a given variable that can be explained by shocks to the other variables 
at various time horizons (tables 2.6-2.8).  In the first subperiod, 82% of forecast error 
variance in coal inventories at a one-month horizon is explained by own shocks.  This 
number falls to 59% at a twelve-month horizon, with natural gas shocks contributing to 
19% of the variance, and the other three economic series contributing between 6% and 
9%.  FEVDs of coal inventories in the second subperiod differ from the first.  Own 
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shocks to coal inventories explain 92% of variance at a one-month horizon, but this 
number falls quickly, reaching 37% at the twelve-month horizon.  Natural gas shocks 
explain 60% of variance in coal inventories at the twelve month horizon, providing 
evidence that regulatory changes in the natural gas sector affected coal inventory 
behavior during this period.  Coal inventories are largely exogenous in the third 
subperiod, with over 90% of variance explained by own shocks at all forecast horizons.  
These findings show that inventory behavior was affected by regulatory changes in the 
1990s to a larger extent than natural shocks to energy markets in the 2000s.   
FEVDs for the electricity price series vary across the three subperiods.  The 
percentage error explained by natural gas costs increases from 3% at a twelve-month 
horizon in the first subperiod, to 28% in the second subperiod, to 70% in the third 
subperiod.  This evidence points towards an increasing level of interaction between the 
two markets as the U.S. shifted from a heavily regulated electricity industry to a more 
competitive landscape. 
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Table 2.5. Test for Variable Exclusion, Stationarity, and Weak Exogeneity for 
the Three Subperiods. P-values in Parentheses 
Test Coal NG Coal Inv Elec Bonds 
July 1976-September 1993 
Stationarity 26.29 
(0.00) 
25.40 
(0.00) 
23.34 
(0.00) 
25.34 
(0.00) 
18.43 
(0.00) 
Exclusion 6.27  
(0.01) 
11.24 
(0.00) 
6.15  
(0.01) 
0.27  
(0.60) 
9.66  
(0.00) 
Weak Exogeneity 5.09  
(0.02) 
9.94 
(0.00) 
10.06 
(0.00) 
1.25  
(0.27) 
3.11  
(0.08) 
October 1993-December 2001 
Stationarity 12.33 
(0.03) 
14.04 
(0.02) 
15.66 
(0.01) 
11.86 
(0.04) 
15.08 
(0.01) 
Exclusion 7.89  
(0.05) 
16.86 
(0.00) 
9.88  
(0.02) 
15.06 
(0.00) 
4.23 
(0.238) 
Weak Exogeneity 32.97 
(0.00) 
10.88 
(0.01) 
15.88 
(0.00) 
18.86 
(0.00) 
8.87  
(0.03) 
January 2002-October 2014 
Stationarity 25.99 
(0.00) 
10.19 
(0.07) 
21.11 
(0.00) 
8.24 
(0.144) 
22.37 
(0.00) 
Exclusion 2.48  
(0.29) 
33.91 
(0.00) 
2.43  
(0.30) 
32.65 
(0.00) 
6.55  
(0.04) 
Weak Exogeneity 13.87 
(0.00) 
4.60 
(0.10) 
0.02  
(0.99) 
14.86 
(0.001) 
7.66  
(0.02) 
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Figure 2.3 Directed Acyclic Graph for the subperiod July 1976 – September 1993 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Directed Acyclic Graph for the subperiod October 1993 – December 
2001   
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Figure 2.5 Directed Acyclic Graph for the subperiod January 2002 – October 2014 
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Figure 2.6 Impulse Response Functions for the subperiod July 1976 – September 1993 
  
 37 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Impulse Response Functions for the subperiod October 1993 – December 2001  
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Figure 2.8 Impulse Response Functions for the subperiod January 2002 – October 2014 
39 
Table 2.6. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions for the Subperiod July 1976 – 
September 1993 
Contribution of 
Series Months Ahead Coal Natural Gas Coal Inv Elec Bonds 
Coal 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 97.69 1.35 0.43 0.06 0.48 
8 93.70 3.50 0.88 0.05 1.88 
12 91.01 4.86 1.14 0.06 2.93 
Natural Gas 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.02 98.45 1.19 0.15 0.15 
8 0.07 92.73 3.51 0.80 2.90 
12 0.19 86.48 5.16 1.40 6.78 
Coal Inv 1 3.84 7.28 82.46 6.18 0.24 
4 4.68 6.83 78.50 9.28 0.72 
8 5.90 14.18 67.71 7.40 4.80 
12 6.56 19.45 59.15 5.94 8.90 
Electricity 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.24 3.76 
4 0.29 0.68 0.03 93.50 5.50 
8 0.20 1.84 0.04 89.58 8.34 
12 0.15 2.63 0.06 86.81 10.35 
Bonds 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
4 0.51 0.30 0.81 0.02 98.36 
8 0.52 1.45 1.63 0.03 96.37 
12 0.49 2.42 2.12 0.05 94.92 
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Table 2.7. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions for the Subperiod October 
1993 – December 2001 
Contribution of 
Series Months Ahead Coal Natural Gas Coal Inv Elec Bonds 
Coal 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 80.32 0.66 10.60 7.46 0.96 
 8 57.77 1.10 15.52 24.49 1.12 
 12 44.83 0.73 20.99 32.39 1.05 
       
Natural Gas 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 1.50 97.22 0.07 0.98 0.24 
 8 3.71 92.87 0.13 1.48 1.82 
 12 6.90 86.52 0.62 1.32 4.64 
       
Coal Inv 1 0.00 7.62 92.38 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.19 33.15 64.81 0.09 1.77 
 8 0.38 50.25 47.21 0.05 2.12 
 12 0.88 60.14 37.09 0.03 1.86 
       
Electricity 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.84 2.16 
 4 0.15 3.75 1.64 90.09 4.37 
 8 0.12 19.37 3.60 72.41 4.50 
 12 0.20 27.94 5.05 62.85 3.97 
       
Bonds 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 4 1.12 0.57 0.79 0.55 96.67 
 8 0.85 2.86 0.57 3.78 91.96 
 12 0.69 3.64 0.36 7.66 87.65 
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Table 2.8. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions for the Subperiod January 
2002 – October 2014 
Contribution of 
Series Months Ahead Coal Natural Gas Coal Inv Elec Bonds 
Coal 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 93.73 1.83 0.01 0.95 3.50 
 8 73.29 15.14 0.03 2.94 8.60 
 12 55.89 27.94 0.05 4.60 11.53 
       
Natural Gas 1 2.74 88.25 8.83 0.00 0.19 
 4 1.76 85.40 10.19 2.55 0.10 
 8 1.57 82.14 12.98 2.71 0.60 
 12 1.46 79.13 15.49 2.49 1.43 
       
Coal Inv 1 0.00 0.00 97.90 0.00 2.10 
 4 0.06 7.04 90.42 1.10 1.39 
 8 0.05 7.24 90.61 0.99 1.10 
 12 0.04 6.66 91.48 0.88 0.94 
       
Electricity 1 1.44 46.55 4.66 47.26 0.10 
 4 1.88 64.06 7.25 26.76 0.05 
 8 1.84 68.90 9.37 19.81 0.08 
 12 1.78 69.36 11.58 16.96 0.32 
       
Bonds 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 4 1.99 2.09 0.01 2.52 93.39 
 8 2.86 7.20 0.01 2.87 87.07 
 12 3.37 12.14 0.02 2.53 81.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
Alternative Specifications of the Full Model 
An alternative to using the simultaneous determination procedure of Wang and Bessler 
(2005) is a two-step process in which optimal lag order ( ) is selected in the first step, 
and then cointegrating rank ( ) is determined in the second step.  Information criteria are 
used to select   in a levels VAR, then a trace test following Johansen (1992) is 
performed to select  .  Results of the first step are reported in table 2.9.  There is a 
disagreement between the two criteria, as the Schwarz loss metric is minimized at     
lag and the Hannan and Quinn loss metric is minimized at     lags.  Because of this 
discrepancy, the trace test is carried out for both scenarios, and the sequence of test 
statistics   
   
 is calculated recursively for each.  The trace test finds three cointegrating 
vectors (   ) for the one lag case, and one cointegrating vector in the three lag case 
(table 2.10). 
Parameter constancy tests (the sequence   
   
) for the     and     are 
displayed in figure 2.9 (Case 2), and for     and     in figure 2.10 (Case 3).  Only 
the R1-Form is reported in Case 2; by definition, a choice of     leads to the absence 
of short-run parameters in the estimated VECM.  The test statistic follows a similar 
pattern in both Case 2 and 3, as well as in the original scenario where     and     
(Case 1).  The pattern of rejection, however, differs between the three cases.  Case 2, 
which has one less lag but the same number of cointegrating vectors as Case 1, rejects 
continuously over the sample period 1981 to roughly mid-2001.  Case 2 more readily 
rejects the null hypothesis of parameter constancy than does Case 1.  On the other hand,  
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Table 2.9. Optimal Lag Length Determination 
k Schwarz Information 
Criterion 
Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion 
1 -29.94 -30.29 
2 -29.90 -30.44 
3 -29.76 -30.50 
4 -29.43 -30.35 
5 -29.11 -30.23 
6 -28.91 -30.22 
7 -28.48 -29.99 
8 -28.06 -29.77 
9 -27.78 -29.68 
10 -27.37 -29.45 
11 -27.03 -29.31 
12 -26.63 -29.10 
13 -26.47 -29.14 
14 -26.12 -28.98 
 
 
Table 2.10. Results of Trace Test for Lag Order     and     
r  Trace Critical Value (5%) P-Value 
     
0  339.331 111.420 0.000 
1  129.640 82.351 0.000 
2  67.979 57.190 0.005 
3  24.381 35.854 0.442 
4  10.370 18.084 0.410 
     
0  142.257 111.420 0.000 
1  82.661 82.351 0.047 
2  44.174 57.190 0.377 
3  13.589 35.854 0.963 
4  1.360 18.084 1.000 
The null hypothesis for each           is that    .  The first rejection occurs at 
   , therefore three cointegrating vectors are selected. 
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the sequence   
   
 never reaches the rejection region in Case 3, which has one more lag 
and one less cointegrating vector than Case 1.   
These results suggest the possibility that fitting the model with a higher degree of 
short-run dependence leads to a lower probability of rejection of constancy in the long 
run parameters.  It might also be the case that fitting a model with a lower number of 
cointegrating vectors leads to a similar result.  Simulation studies to examine these 
possibilities are left as a suggestion for further research. 
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Figure 2.9. Results of test for constancy of   following Hansen and Johansen (1999) for VECM with     and    .  
The null hypothesis at each   is that  ̂     ̂   .  The 5% critical value for the test is 4.17. 
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Figure 2.10. Results of test for constancy of   following Hansen and Johansen (1999) for VECM with     and    .  
The null hypothesis at each   is that  ̂     ̂   .  The 5% critical value for the test is 2.88.
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Conclusions 
This study characterizes the long run relationships concerning coal inventory behavior in 
the U.S. electric power sector.  In line with previous studies, cointegrating relationships 
are found among the five endogenous series in the study: coal inventory, coal and natural 
gas costs to electric power plants (input prices), electricity prices (output prices), and 
Aaa corporate bond rates (opportunity costs).  All series are found to be contained in the 
long run relationships and react to shocks in the system to bring it back to equilibrium.  
A test for parameter constancy in a VECM containing the five series reveals two periods 
of instability in the long run relationships, from mid-1981 to mid-1986, and from mid-
1994 to mid-2001.   
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 had large impacts on the coal industry, resulting in 
changes in railroad practices and rail rates.  The initial period of instability shows that 
the long run relationships among coal inventory, prices, and opportunity costs were 
likely affected by the passage of the Act.  Following the initial period of parameter 
instability, the long run relationships remain constant for approximately eight years.  
During this span, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 were signed into action, 
FERC issued an order to unbundle sales from transportation in the natural gas industry, 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was introduced, and NAFTA was established in January 
of 1994.  Following the Clean Air Act Amendments, an upward trend in the test statistic 
  
   
 begins, and reaches the rejection region in mid-1994, where it remains for a period 
of seven years.  During this period of instability, FERC issued several orders pertaining 
to deregulation of the electric power sector and promotion of wholesale power 
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competition.  Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol was signed in late 1997.  It is plausible 
that the long run relationships entered an unstable period following the new regulations 
of the early 1990s and stayed there because of continued regulatory and policy 
fluctuations throughout the decade.    
Following the second period of instability, the test is unable to reject the 
hypothesis of parameter constancy for the remainder of the sample, which includes two 
major shocks to energy markets (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and the onset of 
the U.S. shale gas boom in the mid-to-late 2000s).  These shifts in market conditions did 
not result in the same level of instability which was observed during the changing 
regulatory environment of the 1990s.  This idea is supported by the finding that natural 
gas shocks contribute up to 60% of the forecast error variance in coal inventories during 
the subperiod October 1993-December 2001, but less than 7% during the subperiod 
January 2002-October 2014.  This is not to say that decision makers in the electric power 
sector did not react to price changes caused by these events, but rather that the long run 
relationship between inventory decisions, prices, and opportunity costs did not change as 
a result. 
To explore the potential sources of instability, all 26 subsets of the five 
endogenous variables are examined for parameter constancy.  This investigation reveals 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that the initial period of instability is related to 
structural changes in the coal industry caused by the Staggers Rail Act.  Additionally, 
natural gas costs and electricity prices are found to be a major contributor to the second 
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period of instability.  Deregulation of natural gas and electricity markets is a likely 
source of this instability. 
Following the investigation of parameter instability, the sample period is split 
into three subperiods (July 1976-September 1993, October 1993-December 2001, and 
January 2002-October 2014).  Innovation accounting procedures are carried out for each 
subperiod.  IRFs and FEVDs show that the contribution of unexpected shocks to input 
and output prices and opportunity costs to the behavior of the coal inventory series 
showed some fluctuation across the three subperiods.  In particular, inventory behavior 
shows larger responses to coal costs following the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, and to 
natural gas costs during the period of regulatory instability in the 1990s than in the other 
two subperiods.  
This study shows that major policy changes in the 1990s appear to have disrupted 
long run relationships characterizing management behavior in the electricity industry.  
Further, these policy changes are shown to be larger sources of instability than natural 
shifts in market conditions (natural gas supply shock).  Policy makers should be aware 
that altering the regulatory environment can cause considerable fluctuations in how 
firms‟ inventory decisions interact with input and output markets and opportunity costs 
in the long run.  Finally, the system shows a high level of resiliency.  Despite all of the 
events over the last 40 years, the system long run relationships remain constant 
approximately 68% of the time.  External and internal events will continue to influence 
the coal inventory system, but there is no reason to think the system will not continue to 
be highly resilient. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRICE INTERACTION IN STATE LEVEL RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDIT 
TRADING PROGRAMS 
 
Over the course of the last fifteen years, the majority of U.S. states have adopted policies 
for encouraging the use of renewable energy sources.  As of June 2015, 29 states and the 
District of Columbia had some form of a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS); eight 
more states had declared goals to achieve standards in the near future (Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency 2015).  RPS programs generally require retail 
electricity suppliers to provide a minimum percentage of total generation from 
renewable sources; suppliers comply with the requirement by redeeming an appropriate 
amount of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).  A utility whose electricity portfolio is 
entirely made up of fossil fuel sources, for example, will need to purchase an adequate 
number of RECs to achieve the minimum requirement set forth by the RPS.  A REC is a 
certificate equivalent to a unit of electricity generated from an approved renewable 
source.  RECs are produced contemporaneously with the unit of qualified electricity, but 
they are bought and sold separately from the electricity.  This creates a distinct market in 
which RECs may be traded before compliance submission.   
In the last decade, there has been a marked expansion in the use of tradable rights 
programs to address environmental goals, both in the U.S. and internationally (Goulder 
2013).  In August 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a 
final rule to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the electric power sector (U.S. EPA 
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2015b).  The rule has been under heavy scrutiny from politicians, media members, and 
researchers alike; it has recently been described as “… more or less a forced Renewable 
Portfolio Standard…” (McConnell 2015).  It is important, therefore, to understand the 
functionality of currently existing programs as U.S. states move towards an energy 
future that is more reliant on renewables.  This chapter helps accomplish this goal by 
evaluating the dynamic relationships among REC prices in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, electricity prices, and natural gas prices.  Previous studies have pointed out 
the need for additional empirical analysis of RPS programs (Felder 2011; Fischer 2010).  
This chapter contributes to the RPS literature by exploiting a modeling framework 
(multivariate time series analysis) to examine market relationships which have been 
introduced in the literature with little empirical examination.   
By using a multivariate time-series approach, data-driven results are obtained to 
describe the REC market relationships mentioned above.  First, the dynamic causal 
relationships between REC and electricity prices are examined in this study.  As Felder 
(2011) argues, theory suggests that the price of a REC is determined by the difference 
between the cost of generation for the renewable resource and the revenue obtained from 
producing electricity.  An increase (decrease) in electricity prices, therefore, is expected 
to correspond to a decrease (increase) in REC prices.   
Second, the empirical analysis examines the relationship among REC prices 
across states.  Many states allow RECs from qualified out-of-state renewable sources to 
be used for in-state compliance.  Both the Massachusetts and Connecticut RPS rules, for 
example, consider any source from within the ISO-New England (ISO-NE) regional 
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transmission organization (RTO) as a qualified source.  As noted by Schmalensee 
(2011), however, REC markets are generally fragmented and differences in prices from 
state to state may be large.     
Literature Review 
The literature on the general structure, cost-effectiveness, and economic implications of 
state level RPS programs is expanding.  Berry (2002), writing in the early years of RPS 
implementation, hypothesizes that the price of RECs should be tied to the excess cost of 
electricity generation from renewable sources over that of traditional sources.  REC 
prices should represent the “cost premium” of renewable power.  
Several studies evaluate the potential effects of RPS on various elements of the 
electric power sector.  Palmer and Burtraw (2005), for instance, employ the Haiku 
electricity market simulation model to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of numerous 
hypothetical national RPS scenarios.  They find that as the percentage requirement of the 
RPS increases, electricity and REC prices increase, and coal and natural gas generation 
decline.  Nogee, Deyette, and Clemmer (2007), in reviewing studies of RPS programs, 
conclude that a national RPS system would reduce fossil-fuel prices (especially natural 
gas) and also reduce electricity prices.  Assuming that REC prices represent the above-
market cost of renewable energy, Wiser et al. (2007) estimate that RPS mandates caused 
retail electricity rates to increase between zero and one percent for the seven states 
considered.  Chen et al. (2009) review 31 studies which were generally conducted during 
the proposed or adoption phase of RPS.  They find that the majority of studies predict 
electricity rate increases of less than one percent, though they stress that there is large 
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uncertainty in the estimates.  Based generally on simulation models, projected electricity 
rates range from a decrease of 5.2% to an 8.8% increase.     
Taking a somewhat different stance from other studies, Felder (2011) suggests 
that a more holistic approach is needed to evaluate the existence of a “price-suppression 
effect.”   This effect characterizes the displacement of higher marginal cost resources 
with low marginal cost renewable sources, resulting in a decrease of the wholesale price 
of electricity.  Fischer (2010) attempts to account for the variability in studies regarding 
the cost impacts of RPS programs (whether RPS program increase or decrease electricity 
prices).  She finds that the elasticity of supply from renewable sources relative to 
conventional sources and the stringency of the RPS help explain some of the variation in 
estimated cost impacts.  Fischer (2010) remarks that better empirical evidence is 
necessary to properly evaluate the impacts of RPS programs.  Assessing the efficiency of 
RPS programs, Schmalensee (2011) observes high levels of price dispersion between 
state REC prices.  He concludes that this variation is a result of fragmented markets with 
high transaction costs.   
The empirical literature on RPS programs, while growing, has resulted in 
inconclusive and contrasting findings regarding the relationship between REC prices and 
electricity prices (Chen et al. 2009).  Other studies (Berry 2002; Felder 2011; 
Schmalensee 2011) develop hypotheses about this relationship, as well as the interaction 
of REC prices across states, without any econometric or statistical techniques to test the 
hypotheses empirically.  This lack of empirical examination of RPS programs is noted in 
the literature (Chen et al. 2009; Felder 2011; Fischer 2010). 
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REC Market Fundamentals  
To provide an understanding of the fundamentals of the REC market, consider the 
simple case in which a state has an RPS requirement that five percent of its electricity 
must come from renewable sources.  For each megawatt hour (MWh) that a renewable 
source generates and sells, one REC is created.  For every 20 MWh of total electricity 
sold onto the grid, one REC must be retired.  Hence, a renewable source that generates 
20 MWh will have 19 surplus RECs that can be sold.  These RECs may be bought by 
electricity suppliers whose generation portfolio is composed of less than five percent 
renewables.   
In RPS programs, there are a number of important institutional details that 
influence REC markets.  Connecticut and Massachusetts are discussed here as they are 
the states included in the empirical analysis.  Institutional details summarized here are 
from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency Sources (2015).  
Sources eligible for REC generation are typically divided into two classes (or tiers) 
based on the fuel or the age of the source.  In both states, electricity suppliers must meet 
two different requirements; percentage requirements from Class I sources and from 
Class II sources.  Class I RECs can be used for compliance with the Class II 
requirement, but the reverse is not true.  Eligible generation sources in the Massachusetts 
RPS include geothermal, solar thermal, solar PV, wind, biomass, hydroelectric, and 
waste-to-energy.  The Massachusetts Class I REC distinction requires that the source of 
generation be installed after December 31, 1997.  Connecticut accepts similar sources of 
electricity generation, but the Connecticut Class I distinction requires that the source be 
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specifically from solar, wind, fuel cells, geothermal, ocean thermal, tidal, small 
hydroelectric facilities, and a few other advanced technologies (but not waste-to-energy 
or older hydroelectric plants).   
The Massachusetts RPS also contains provisions for a solar “carve-out” in which 
a certain percentage of Class I requirements must be met specifically from solar sources, 
creating the MA Solar REC (SREC) trading instrument.  Connecticut does not contain 
such a provision.  There are a number of institutional complications in SREC programs 
which may drive prices
4
 (Coulon, Khazaei, and Powell 2015; Felder and Loxley 2012; 
Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources 2015; SRECTrade 2015).  Additionally, 
the overall costs of generation from solar photovoltaic generation have decreased in 
recent years (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2013).  These regulatory 
idiosyncrasies in the MA SREC market may have a large influence on market 
performance, making it unwarranted to include SREC prices in the econometric 
analysis.
5
  
An important feature of both the Connecticut and Massachusetts RPS programs 
is that both Class I requirements can be met with RECs that were generated by sources 
within the ISO-NE RTO (eligible sources do not necessarily have to be in-state).  A 
wind turbine in Connecticut, for example, produces RECs that are eligible to be used for 
the MA Class I requirement.  Both states have legislation in place to prevent double-
                                                 
4
 For instance, the MA SREC market contains a price support in which the state ensures that end-of-period 
unsold SRECs will be purchased in a clearinghouse auction at a fixed price (Massachusetts Department of 
Energy Resources 2015). 
5
 As a check, the specified model was extended to include the MA SREC price series.  Results of 
statistical tests for variable exclusion and weak exogeneity provide confirmatory evidence that the MA 
SREC series is determined outside of the estimated system. 
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counting of RECs (the same REC being used for compliance in two states).  The 
Massachusetts solar carve-out, however, only accepts eligible in-state sources. 
 Massachusetts and Connecticut RECs can be banked for up to two years; giving a 
useful life of three years to each REC.  The year in which the REC is generated is called 
its “vintage,” for instance a REC generated in 2011 would be a Vintage 2011 REC and 
could be used for compliance in 2011, 2012, or 2013.  In this study, the price of a 
current-year vintage of each REC instrument is used as the price observation for a given 
time period.  As a penalty for non-compliance, states generally charge an Alternative 
Compliance Payment (ACP) to suppliers who fall short of their requirement.  The level 
of the ACP in Massachusetts is adjusted annually based on the Consumer Price Index.  
The 2014 ACP rate for the Massachusetts Class I standard was $66.16/MWh, for Class 
II was $27.16/MWh, and for SREC was $523.00/MWh.  Connecticut has a fixed Class I 
ACP at $55/MWh.  The ACP essentially creates a price cap for RECs, as any electricity 
provider that is short of the requirement would typically pay the ACP if faced with a 
REC price that exceeds the ACP. 
Economic theory helps provide insights into REC price formation.  REC prices 
are determined by supply and demand conditions in the REC market.  The key to 
understanding REC prices lies in the dependence of the supply and demand of RECs on 
the market for wholesale electricity (and in turn, on the markets for renewable and 
conventional generation).  Basic economics of the REC market are depicted in figure 
3.1.  The total marginal revenue received by a renewable electricity producer (the 
vertical axis) is equal to the sum of the REC price and the electricity price (PR + PE).  
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The demand for RECs is largely a function of the RPS requirement, which is determined 
by the state legislatures (Felder and Loxley 2012; Lamontagne 2013).  For a given RPS 
requirement, the annual aggregate demand curve for RECs is a step function in which 
the REC price (PR) is equal to the ACP for quantities less than the RPS requirement and 
falls to zero above the requirement.  The simplified demand curve in figure 3.1 excludes 
the possibility that firms may demand RECs in excess of their percentage requirement to 
hedge future risks or to give the appearance of being “green” or environmentally 
friendly.     
 
Figure 3.1. REC market supply and demand fundamentals 
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The quantity of RECs supplied is directly proportional to the amount of qualified 
renewable energy generation.  For illustrative purposes, the shape of the three supply 
curves in figure 3.1 follow those outlined in New England States Committee on 
Electricity (2012) for wind.  In the case of a low, medium, or high level of renewable 
energy generation, the supply of RECs follows supply curve SR
L
, SR
M
, or SR
H
.  In the 
case of relatively low levels of qualified renewable generation (SR
L
), the REC price will 
fall at or near the ACP.  For high levels of renewable generation (SR
H
), the renewable 
producer will receive only the price of electricity and the REC price will be at or near 
zero.  For a medium level of renewable generation (SR
M
) which intersects the vertical 
(inelastic) portion of the demand curve, the REC price will be susceptible to changes in 
electricity price. 
Assuming that renewable generation is more costly than conventional (nuclear, 
natural gas, or coal) generation, Berry (2002) states that REC price should represent the 
cost premium of renewable sources over their conventional counterparts.  Thus, a 
decrease in the price of conventional generation should lead to an increase in the price of 
RECs.  Felder (2011) claims that REC prices should be determined by the difference 
between the cost of renewable generation and the revenue obtained by generating the 
electricity.  In Felder‟s (2011) framework, a decrease in the price of electricity moves 
the demand curve for RECs downward, leading to an increase in the difference between 
the supply curve and PE, thus increasing the price of RECs.  This framework does not 
directly contradict Berry (2002), as the fall in electricity prices may have been caused by 
a decrease in the cost of conventional generation.  Changes in electricity prices can 
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certainly be precipitated by other market forces (e.g. demand shifts or renewable supply 
shifts), nonetheless, electricity prices and costs of conventional generation are 
potentially important sources of REC price formation. 
 An increase in the supply of RECs corresponds to an increase in the supply of 
renewable generation.  In figure 3.1, this increase in supply of RECs would decrease the 
REC price, ceteris paribus.  This outward shift in the supply curve for electricity, 
however, should also lead to a decrease in the price of wholesale electricity, which 
Felder (2011) calls the price-suppression effect.  This price-suppression effect would 
lead to an increase in the price of RECs (Felder 2011).  The effect of a renewable 
electricity supply shock on REC prices, therefore, depends on the magnitude of the price 
suppression effect.   
 It is important to point out, however, that when the supply curve intersects 
demand in either horizontal range (SR
H
 or SR
L
), shifts in supply or demand will have no 
effect on the REC price, they will remain fixed at the ACP or zero.  Only if the supply 
curve intersects demand in the middle range (SR
M
), does theory predict that changes in 
the supply or demand curve lead to changes in the REC price. 
Data 
The empirical analysis uses four endogenous price variables.  All endogenous series are 
in natural logarithms in the empirical analysis.  Graphs of the natural logarithms of the 
four endogenous price series are presented in figure 3.2.  Weekly REC prices, based on 
trade data or derived from indicative quotes when trades are unavailable, are obtained 
from Skystream Markets (2014).  Two Class I REC price series are included in the  
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Figure 3.2. Endogenous price series used in estimating the vector error correction 
model  
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analysis (Connecticut and Massachusetts, denoted as CT Class I and MA Class I) for the 
period March 2011 to December 2013. These price data are the midpoint between bid 
and offer prices for current-year vintages reported by Skystream Markets.  
Unfortunately, data for volume of trades is unavailable.  The previous week‟s 
price is used to fill in any missing observations in the weekly REC price data.  The U.S. 
EIA (2015b) publishes wholesale electricity price data for the ISO-NE RTO.  The third 
endogenous price series is a weighted average of daily on-peak wholesale electricity 
prices based on volume traded to provide a weekly electricity price for the region 
(denoted as MassHub).  Natural gas spot prices (denoted as NG) from the Algonquin 
Hub in Massachusetts (Bloomberg 2015) are included as the final endogenous variable 
to capture the costs of conventional electricity generation.  Data on cooling and heating 
degree days for the New England region (U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 2015), which roughly aligns geographically with the ISO-NE RTO, are 
exogenous variables in the model. 
As seen in figure 3.2, the CT and MA Class I REC prices are essentially 
unchanging in the final third of the sample.  Both price series are at or near the ACP 
level defined by the respective state RPS (the market price is determined in the initial 
horizontal portion of the demand curve in figure 3.1).  In this case, the market is short 
and REC price is not expected to react.  The sample is reduced for this reason; it is 
constrained to a period where the market is in the vertical portion of the demand curve.  
Weekly observations for the period March 28, 2011 to December 17, 2012 are used to 
carry out the empirical analysis (a total of 91 observations).   
 62 
 
Methodology 
The vector error correction model (VECM) provides a flexible framework to 
characterize the REC market relationships.  Let   be the number of endogenous 
variables and  be the number of exogenous variables in the model.  The VECM 
(Juselius 2006) takes the form: 
(3.1)              ∑                       
   
    
where:  
      is a       vector of the endogenous variables at time  ;  
       is a       vector of first differences of the endogenous series; 
     is a       vector of constants; 
         represents lagged values of order  ; 
      is the corresponding       coefficient matrix; 
     is the optimal number of lags in a levels vector autoregressive representation; 
      is a       vector of exogenous series (cooling and heating degree days); 
      is a       vector of innovations; and 
         is the “error correction” term, where   is      . 
 The VECM allows long run, equilibrium relationships among the variables to be 
characterized by examining the existence of cointegration.  Cointegration is present 
when there exists at least one linear combination of non-stationary variables which is 
itself stationary (Tsay 2014).  A key assumption for the estimation of a VECM is that the 
endogenous variables (  ) are non-stationary, but that they are stationary in first 
differences (   ).  Three tests for stationarity are considered, two common pre-model 
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estimation tests and one post-model estimation test.  Results of Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (Fuller 1996) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) tests for stationarity of the four 
endogenous series are reported in table 3.1 (pre-model estimation tests).  Under the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, all series are non-stationary in natural log levels, but 
stationary in first differences, except for the CT Class I REC price.  Further investigation 
using the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) reveals that all four series are non-
stationary in natural log levels, and stationary in first differences.  As noted, a third test 
for stationarity is performed after model estimation. 
 
Table 3.1.  Results of Tests for Presence of Unit Root 
 ADF (  : Unit Root) KPSS (  : Stationarity) 
Series Test Statistic Decision
a Test Statistic Decision 
log(Series) 
  
  
CT Class I -1.89 F 2.19 R 
MA Class I -1.89 F 2.20 R 
MassHub -2.64 R 0.35 R 
NG -2.35 F 0.59 R 
diff(log(Series))     
CT Class I -2.51 F 0.25 F 
MA Class I -4.53 R 0.30 F 
MassHub -4.02 R 0.05 F 
NG -3.57 R 0.14 F 
a
Based on the 10% critical value of -2.58. 
b
Based on the 10% critical value of 0.35. 
  
 
 
Post-Estimation Hypothesis Tests 
Decomposing   as: 
(3.2)                     
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where   and   are       matrices, and   is the rank of   , provides an interpretation of 
the long run relationships among the endogenous series.  Because      is non-stationary 
and     is stationary,     contains stationary linear combination(s) of the   endogenous 
variables, provided cointegration is present.  The   columns of   are known as the 
cointegrating vectors (Tsay 2014).  Statistical tests are performed on  ,  , and   to 
determine   and to further characterize the long run structure between the endogenous 
series (Juselius 2006; Mjelde and Bessler 2009).   
The first test for examining the cointegrating space is a test for variable 
stationarity.  The null hypothesis is that at least one of the cointegrating vectors exists 
because a particular variable is itself stationary given the number of lags and 
cointegrating vectors found in the system.  In other words, the cointegrating vector does 
not represent a stationary linear combination of non-stationary variables, but rather a 
transformation of an otherwise stationary variable.  Results of this test complement the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and KPSS tests for stationarity presented in table 3.1. 
Variable exclusion tests the null hypothesis that a particular series is not in the 
cointegrating space:  
(3.3)          
              
where   is a matrix containing zero restrictions for excluding a particular series from the 
cointegrating space.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis for a given series implies that 
the corresponding series is excluded from the long run relationships characterizing the 
system (  contains the parameters characterizing these long run relationships). 
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 A third statistical test is for weak exogeneity; the null hypothesis is that a 
particular series does not adjust to disruptions in the long run relationships.  As   
contains the parameters characterizing the long run relationships,   comprises the 
parameters which describe how the series adjust to disruptions, bringing the long run 
relationships back to equilibrium.  The null hypothesis of the test for weak exogeneity is: 
(3.4)         
              
where , like  , contains zero restrictions for excluding the corresponding   parameters 
for a particular series.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis for a given series implies that 
the corresponding series does not respond to deviations from the long run equilibrium 
relationship. 
Innovation Accounting 
In addition to statistical tests concerning the cointegrating space, innovation accounting 
procedures (impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions) are 
helpful in characterizing dynamic relationships among economic variables.  Impulse 
response functions (IRFs) show the effect of a one-time shock in one variable on the 
future values of the remaining variables.  Forecast error variance decompositions 
(FEVDs) measure the percentage of forecast error for a given series that is explained by 
shocks to each of the series.  To conduct innovation accounting procedures, the VECM 
in equation (3.1) is rewritten in a levels vector autoregressive (VAR) model: 
(3.5)                       ∑                                 
   
   . 
An issue that arises when conducting innovation accounting procedures is that 
the contemporaneous covariance matrix of the error term    in equation (3.5),   , is 
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usually not a diagonal matrix in empirical applications (the components of the error term 
are contemporaneously correlated).  If this is the case, then any particular series cannot 
necessarily be shocked without affecting another series; innovation accounting 
procedures are nonsensical if contemporaneous correlation exists (Tsay 2014).  To 
overcome this limitation, the innovations    must be orthogonalized.  Consider a 
Bernanke (1986) ordering, where the correlated innovations    are written as a function 
of the underlying orthogonal sources of variation,   :  
(3.6)         
     .          
To conduct the innovation accounting procedures, the VAR representation, equation 
(3.5), is pre-multiplied by the matrix  . 
 The matrix   is obtained through causal flow methods (Pearl 2000; Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines 2000).  Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) provide a visual 
summary of contemporaneous causal flows among innovations from the estimated 
VECM.  The GES algorithm (Chickering 2003) in TETRAD V (2015) is employed to 
generate a DAG using the covariance matrix of error terms from the estimated VECM.  
In DAGs, an arrow from node A to node B implies that A causes B.  An undirected line 
from A to B with no arrow (or a line with an arrow on each end) signifies flows between 
the two series, but the algorithm cannot determine whether A causes B or B causes A.  If 
there is no information flow between A and B, the algorithm will not generate a line 
connecting the two series.  The GES algorithm starts with a DAG representation where 
all variables are independent of each other (no lines), and searches over more 
complicated representations for improvements in the Bayesian Information Criterion.  
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The algorithm picks the DAG representation such that no added line or change of 
direction improves the criterion. 
To summarize, results from the empirical analysis help characterize the dynamic 
relationships among REC and electricity prices.  First, the existence of cointegration 
implies that REC and electricity prices move together in the long run.  Statistical tests 
for variable exclusion further investigate whether a particular price series is included in 
the estimated long run relationships.  Tests for weak exogeneity will show whether a 
given series responds to disruptions in the long run relationships.  Further, DAGs show 
how the endogenous price series are related in contemporaneous time.  Impulse response 
functions show the direction of effects of an increase in a particular series on all the 
other endogenous series over time.  Finally, forecast error variance decompositions show 
the percentage of forecast error of each series that can be explained by shocks in the 
other series. 
 Similarly, these procedures shed light on the relationship between MA and CT 
REC prices.  Perhaps most importantly, the existence of cointegration, along with tests 
for variable exclusion and weak exogeneity, provides statistical evidence regarding the 
existence of a long run equilibrium relationship among REC prices.  DAGs and 
innovation accounting procedures further characterize the dynamic relationships across 
state REC prices. 
Results and Discussion 
A two-step procedure is followed to test for cointegration.  First, the optimal lag length 
( ) in a VAR( ) representation is determined (table 3.2).  The lag length ( ) is chosen to 
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be two under the Akaike Information Criterion in the rest of the chapter; the choice of 
    lag would lead to the absence of short run parameters and the inability to conduct 
innovation accounting procedures.  Next, the cointegrating rank ( ) is determined 
following the trace test of Johansen (1991).  One cointegrating vector (   ) is chosen 
(table 3.3).  The remaining discussion of the empirical results is based on a VECM 
specification in equation (3.1) with     lags and     cointegrating vector. 
 
Table 3.2.  Optimal Lag Length Determination 
Lag Order ( ) Schwarz 
Information 
Criterion 
Akaike Information 
Criterion 
Hannan-Quinn 
Information 
Criterion 
0 -12.77 -13.86 -13.13 
1 -17.80 -19.33 -18.62 
2 -16.60 -19.58 -17.90 
3 -15.67 -19.11 -17.44 
4 -14.34 -18.23 -16.58 
5 -13.12 -18.46 -15.84 
6 -11.77 -17.65 -14.98 
7 -10.70 -17.15 -14.42 
8 -9.54 -17.58 -13.76 
9 -8.36 -17.03 -13.10 
10 -7.34 -16.67 -12.62 
 
 
Table 3.3.  Results of Trace Test for Lag Order     
r  Trace Critical Value (5%) P-Value 
0  78.91 73.02 0.02 
1  41.57 49.96 0.23 
2  13.57 30.78 0.87 
3  4.35 15.25 0.84 
The null hypothesis for each           is that    .  The first failure to reject 
occurs at    , therefore one cointegrating vector is selected. 
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Post-Estimation Tests  
Statistical tests for variable exclusion, weak exogeneity, and stationarity are shown in 
table 3.4.  The hypothesis of variable stationarity is rejected at the 5% level for all four 
series.  The cointegrating relationship does not arise because of individual stationarity of 
any of the endogenous price series.  The null hypothesis of variable exclusion cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level for both MA and CT Class I REC price series.  This implies that 
the estimated long run relationship might be the result of integration between natural gas 
and electricity prices only.  Additionally, the hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level for each of the MA and CT Class I REC price series, providing 
evidence that MA and CT Class I REC prices do not respond to disruptions in the 
cointegrating relationship.  Results of the variable exclusion and weak exogeneity tests 
suggest that the two REC markets are not integrated with regional electricity and natural 
gas markets.   
 
Table 3.4.  Test for Variable Exclusion, Stationarity, and Weak Exogeneity. P-
values in Parentheses 
Test CT Class I MA Class I MassHub NG 
Exclusion 0.62        
(0.43) 
1.42       
(0.23) 
15.82      
(0.00) 
15.42      
(0.00) 
Weak Exogeneity 0.24        
(0.63) 
0.00       
(0.99) 
9.29        
(0.00) 
6.04        
(0.01) 
Stationarity 17.62      
(0.00) 
18.68      
(0.00) 
22.10      
(0.00) 
23.74       
(0.00) 
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Contemporaneous Causality 
The DAG generated from the correlation structure of innovations in the VECM is 
presented in figure 3.3.  Causal flows are found between MassHub electricity prices and 
natural gas prices, and between MA and CT Class I REC prices, but the algorithm is 
unable to determine the direction of flows in either case.  Regarding the relationship 
between natural gas and electricity prices, it is important to note that natural gas is the 
most common fuel source used for on-peak power generation.
6
  Periods of high 
electricity demand result in demand spikes in the natural gas market.  Likewise, periods 
of high natural gas prices increase generation costs for on-peak power generation, which 
is expected to affect wholesale electricity prices.
7
   
 
 
Figure 3.3. Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) for contemporaneous causal flows 
among innovations  
 
                                                 
6
 Natural gas is a large portion of the overall electricity generation portfolio in both Massachusetts (58% in 
2014) and Connecticut (44%) (U.S. EIA 2015c).  
7
 Mjelde and Bessler (2009) find contemporaneous causal flows from on-peak electricity prices to natural 
gas prices using weekly data for the period June 2001 – April 2008 and the GES algorithm.   
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As noted above, the MA and CT Class I requirements both allow RECs from out-
of-state (but within the ISO-NE RTO). The MA renewable generation market is much 
larger than the CT market, but the renewable proportion of total electric generation 
capacity is similar in both states.
8
  Accordingly, there is no a priori reasoning to 
eliminate a possible direction of contemporaneous flows between either natural gas and 
electricity prices or the two state REC prices.  All four possible combinations of 
contemporaneous causal flows are considered (innovation accounting procedures are 
carried out for four different versions of the matrix   in equation 3.6).  
Innovation Accounting Procedures 
IRFs and FEVDs computed from each of the four possible combinations of directed 
flows in the DAG are presented in figures 3.4-3.7 and tables 3.5-3.8.
9,10
  The IRFs show 
strong links between natural gas and electricity prices in all DAG specifications 
(consistent with previous literature).
11
  Natural gas prices respond positively to shocks in 
electricity prices, and vice versa.  IRFs across each DAG specification are consistent in 
suggesting that CT Class I REC and the MA Class I REC prices do not respond to 
shocks in either electricity or natural gas prices.  Similarly, neither electricity nor natural 
gas prices respond to shocks in REC prices.  FEVDs show that natural gas and electricity 
prices each explain less than one percent of forecast error variance in REC prices at all 
                                                 
8
 The U.S. EIA (2012) reports that Massachusetts had 0.566 GW of renewable capacity in 2010 (4.1% of 
total electric capacity), about twice as much renewable generating capacity as Connecticut (0.281 GW; 
3.3% of total). 
9
 Figure 3.8 and table 3.9 show the IRF and FEVD for the assumption of no contemporaneous causal flows 
between the MA Class I and CT Class I REC price series. 
10
 As in Chapter II, all IRFs are standardized by dividing through by the standard error of innovations of 
each series. 
11
 See for example Mjelde and Bessler (2009). 
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horizons.  In addition to the results of the variable exclusion and weak exogeneity tests 
above, these findings provide further evidence of little interaction between REC markets 
and the ISO-NE electricity and Algonquin Hub natural gas markets. 
The IRFs and FEVDs suggest a relationship between MA and CT Class I REC 
prices, however, the characterization of this relationship is sensitive to the direction of 
contemporaneous causal flows in the DAG.  Assuming contemporaneous causal flows 
from MA to CT Class I REC prices, the MA Class I series explains around 67% of 
forecast error variance in CT Class I REC prices at all horizons (tables 3.5 and 3.6).  CT 
Class I REC prices respond positively to shocks in MA Class I REC prices and the MA 
Class I REC series is almost entirely exogenous (figures 3.4 and 3.5).  When the 
direction of contemporaneous causal flows is reversed, so are these results.  Sixty-seven 
percent of forecast error variance in MA Class I REC prices is explained by CT Class I 
REC prices, MA Class I REC prices respond positively to shocks in CT Class I REC 
prices, and the CT Class I REC series is exogenous (figures 3.6 and 3.7; tables 3.7 and 
3.8).  The asymmetric relationships between these REC prices is surprising since, as 
noted above, Connecticut allows RECs from qualified generation in Massachusetts and 
vice versa.  An explanation for this finding is the nature of the ACP structure mentioned 
previously (MA 2014 Class I ACP was $66.16/MWh and CT Class I ACP was 
$55/MWh).  A Massachusetts REC buyer will look to purchase in the Connecticut REC 
market if faced with a MA REC price higher than the CT ACP, thus increasing the 
demand for CT RECs.  Conversely, a CT REC seller will look to sell RECs in the MA 
REC market if the current MA price is above the CT ACP.  The CT seller is willing to.  
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Table 3.5.  Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (Contemporaneous Causal 
Flows from MA Class I to CT Class I and MassHub to NG)  
Contribution of 
Series Weeks Ahead CT Class I MA Class I MassHub NG 
CT Class I 1 32.92 67.08 0.00 0.00 
 4 32.49 66.85 0.21 0.46 
 8 32.30 66.91 0.25 0.54 
 12 32.23 66.94 0.25 0.58 
      
MA Class I 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.01 99.87 0.07 0.04 
 8 0.01 99.93 0.04 0.02 
 12 0.01 99.95 0.03 0.01 
      
MassHub 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
 4 0.06 0.18 87.30 12.46 
 8 0.10 0.12 80.96 18.83 
 12 0.11 0.10 77.89 21.91 
      
NG 1 0.00 0.00 25.40 74.60 
 4 0.23 1.74 55.99 42.05 
 8 0.27 1.48 61.62 36.64 
 12 0.28 1.39 64.08 34.25 
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Table 3.6.  Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (Contemporaneous Causal 
Flows from MA Class I to CT Class I and NG to MassHub)  
Contribution of 
Series Weeks Ahead CT Class I MA Class I MassHub NG 
CT Class I 1 32.92 67.08 0.00 0.00 
 4 32.49 66.85 0.53 0.14 
 8 32.30 66.91 0.63 0.15 
 12 32.23 66.94 0.66 0.17 
      
MA Class I 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.01 99.87 0.11 0.01 
 8 0.01 99.93 0.06 0.00 
 12 0.01 99.95 0.04 0.00 
      
MassHub 1 0.00 0.00 74.60 25.40 
 4 0.06 0.18 52.89 46.87 
 8 0.10 0.12 41.05 58.73 
 12 0.11 0.10 35.38 64.42 
      
NG 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 4 0.23 1.74 20.25 77.78 
 8 0.27 1.48 19.95 78.31 
 12 0.28 1.39 20.05 78.28 
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Table 3.7.  Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (Contemporaneous Causal 
Flows from CT Class I to MA Class I and NG to MassHub)  
Contribution of 
Series Weeks Ahead CT Class I MA Class I MassHub NG 
CT Class I 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 99.33 0.00 0.53 0.14 
 8 99.21 0.00 0.63 0.15 
 12 99.17 0.00 0.67 0.17 
      
MA Class I 1 67.08 32.92 0.00 0.00 
 4 66.20 33.68 0.11 0.01 
 8 66.20 33.74 0.06 0.00 
 12 66.20 33.76 0.04 0.00 
      
MassHub 1 0.00 0.00 74.60 25.40 
 4 0.78 0.06 52.89 46.87 
 8 0.16 0.06 41.05 58.73 
 12 0.15 0.06 35.38 64.42 
      
NG 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 4 0.75 1.22 20.25 77.78 
 8 0.55 1.19 19.95 78.31 
 12 0.48 1.19 20.05 78.28 
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Table 3.8.  Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (Contemporaneous Causal 
Flows from CT Class I to MA Class I and MassHub to NG)  
Contribution of 
Series Weeks Ahead CT Class I MA Class I MassHub NG 
CT Class I 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 99.33 0.00 0.21 0.46 
 8 99.21 0.00 0.25 0.54 
 12 99.17 0.00 0.25 0.58 
      
MA Class I 1 67.08 32.92 0.00 0.00 
 4 66.20 33.68 0.07 0.04 
 8 66.20 33.74 0.04 0.02 
 12 66.20 33.76 0.03 0.01 
      
MassHub 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
 4 0.18 0.06 87.30 12.46 
 8 0.16 0.06 80.96 19.81 
 12 0.15 0.06 77.89 21.91 
      
NG 1 0.00 0.00 25.40 74.60 
 4 0.75 1.22 56.00 42.05 
 8 0.56 1.19 61.62 36.64 
 12 0.48 1.19 64.08 34.25 
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Table 3.9.  Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (Contemporaneous Causal 
Flows from MassHub to NG and no flows between MA Class I and CT Class I)  
Contribution of 
Series Weeks Ahead CT Class I MA Class I MassHub NG 
CT Class I 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 99.31 0.00 0.24 0.45 
 8 99.18 0.01 0.31 0.51 
 12 99.14 0.01 0.33 0.53 
      
MA Class I 1 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 4 0.03 99.86 0.07 0.04 
 8 0.03 99.91 0.04 0.02 
 12 0.03 99.93 0.03 0.02 
      
MassHub 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
 4 0.19 0.17 87.21 12.45 
 8 0.29 0.17 80.78 18.77 
 12 0.34 0.17 77.68 21.83 
      
NG 1 0.00 0.00 25.40 74.60 
 4 0.68 3.62 54.65 41.05 
 8 0.79 3.53 60.01 35.67 
 12 0.84 3.54 62.32 33.30 
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Figure 3.4 Impulse Response Functions (causal flows from MA Class I to CT Class I and MassHub to NG) 
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Figure 3.5 Impulse Response Functions (causal flows from MA Class I to CT Class I and NG to MassHub) 
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Figure 3.6 Impulse Response Functions (causal flows from CT Class I to MA Class I and NG to MassHub) 
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Figure 3.7 Impulse Response Functions (causal flows from CT Class I to MA Class I and MassHub to NG) 
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Figure 3.8 Impulse Response Functions (causal flows from MassHub to NG and no flows between MA Class I and CT 
Class I)
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settle at a price lower than the MA market price, putting downward pressure on the MA 
price.  The direction of contemporaneous causality is important in characterizing which 
state‟s market plays a bigger role in price formation 
Investigating the Potential of a Structural Break 
Close inspection of the data reveals a jump in the level of the MA Class I REC price 
series in early 2012.  The price increased by $8.00, or 22%, from January 23, 2012 to 
February 20, 2012 and by another $8.00 on March 5, 2012 (a 17% increase from 
February 20).  The magnitude of this jump warrants inspection of the possibility of a 
structural break in the relationships between MA and CT REC, natural gas, and 
electricity prices. 
 Two tests for structural breaks are carried out; the first introduced by Bai and 
Perron (2003) and the second following Hansen and Johansen (1999).  The test of Bai 
and Perron (2003) treats both the number and date of breaks as unknown.  This is done 
by partitioning the dataset multiple times, estimating the coefficients of the model for 
each partition, and finding where the sum of squared residuals is minimized.  F-statistics 
are computed for two types of hypotheses, the first testing the null of no structural 
breaks against the alternative of  breaks and the second being a sequential test of  
versus    breaks.  The Bai and Perron (2003) test is conducted for the four equations 
of a VAR model of MA and CT Class I REC prices, electricity prices, and natural gas 
prices.  Each equation is tested under a VAR model in natural logarithms and under a 
VAR model in first difference natural logarithms.  Results (Appendix B) show no 
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potential breaks in any of the four equations for either VAR model, suggesting that there 
are no breaks in the short or long run relationships among the series. 
 Hansen and Johansen (1999) present a test for parameter constancy which is 
based on the recursive estimation of a VECM model.  In this study, the VECM specified 
above (two lags, one cointegrating vector) is re-estimated in a recursive fashion, adding 
one observation at a time.  Estimates of the long run ( ) parameters at each step in the 
recursion are compared to the full sample estimates to look for deviations.  See Chapter 
II for a detailed explanation of the test.  Results of the Hansen and Johansen (1999) test 
(Appendix B) exhibit stability of the   parameters over the entire sample. 
 Taken together, the tests of Bai and Perron (2003) and Hansen and Johansen 
(1999) reject the possibility of a structural break in the model parameters.  While there is 
a jump in the levels of the MA Class I price series in early 2012, the relationship 
governing the joint behavior of the four variables appears not to change. Accordingly, 
inferences based on the full sample estimates of model parameters about how REC 
prices are related to electricity and natural gas prices, and to each other across states, are 
discussed further below. 
Divergence between Theory and the Data 
As discussed above, theory suggests that an increase in electricity prices or in natural gas 
prices should result in a decrease in REC prices (Felder 2011; Berry 2002).  The results 
above point to a lack of integration between REC prices and electricity and natural gas 
markets.  Specifically, REC prices do not respond to shocks in either electricity prices or 
natural gas prices.  Further, MA and CT Class I REC prices are not found to be a part of 
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the cointegrating space, evidence that the REC markets across states are less integrated 
than expected.  Possible reasons why the Connecticut and Massachusetts REC markets 
have not behaved according to fundamentals are presented below.  
 First, it is worthwhile to note that the Connecticut and Massachusetts REC 
markets are relatively immature (the first compliance year in Massachusetts was 2003, 
and in Connecticut was 2006).  Any market will have an initial period of learning and 
adaptation for market participants.  As explained below, these REC markets in particular 
are characterized by additional complications which may extend the learning curve and 
present a high level of uncertainty for all parties.  Schmalensee (2011 p. 61) summarizes 
this argument, explaining that REC markets are fragmented and thin, do not work well, 
and “are sometimes markedly out of line with their fundamental determinants.”  A lack 
of information may cause market participants to heavily weight the most recent trading 
price as the signal, rather than taking into account market conditions.  Additionally, 
Schmalensee (2011) notes that transaction costs appear to be large in REC markets.  
High transaction costs may conflate the inability of market participants to properly take 
into account all available information.  The gradual climb in REC prices observed in 
figure 3.2 may be the result of high uncertainty in the marketplace.   
Perhaps most importantly, institutional intervention in RPS programs may be 
contributing in driving REC markets away from fundamentals.  Felder and Loxley 
(2012) discuss this issue in SREC markets, but some of their analysis can be generalized 
to REC markets.  They explain that volatile SREC prices solicit complaints from both 
solar providers and ratepayers alike.  Pressure from market participants may provoke 
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policy makers to alter RPS legislation.  There is evidence of this occurring in both the 
Massachusetts and Connecticut REC markets.  For example, in July 2008, five years 
after the Massachusetts program was introduced, the state legislature introduced a bill 
that required electricity suppliers to enter at least two long-term contracts for RECs 
during a three year period (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency 
2015).  The provisions of this legislation were amended in June 2010, August 2012, and 
March 2013.  Connecticut legislators passed a similar bill in 2011.  Other changes to the 
Connecticut RPS mandate include altering the qualifications for Class I and Class II 
sources, and planned decreases in REC price for less-desirable renewables (Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency 2015).  Thin and fragmented markets 
make it difficult for policy makers to understand market developments.  This may have 
caused policy makers to modify RPS legislation, resulting in additional uncertainty for 
market participants. 
 An additional potential contributing factor is the near-verticality of the demand 
curve for RECs.  As with any good for which demand is highly inelastic, the market 
price of RECs is especially sensitive to supply shifts.  Felder and Loxley (2012) discuss 
this issue in SREC markets specifically.  They note that a change in supply, however 
small in magnitude, can cause a large swing in price.  This might encourage large 
renewable producers to withhold RECs from the market to increase price.  Importantly, 
supply shifts like these are not driven by electricity or conventional generation price 
expectations and will not be captured by the model implemented here.  
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Conclusions  
The relationships between REC prices, wholesale electricity prices, and costs of 
conventional generation have been contemplated in the literature without much 
statistical investigation.  The empirical analysis shows that neither Massachusetts nor 
Connecticut Class I REC prices respond to shocks in MassHub electricity prices.  This 
result is inconsistent with the theory outlined by Felder (2011), who hypothesized that 
REC prices should represent the difference between the cost of renewable electricity 
generation and the revenue obtained for producing it.  An increase in electricity prices 
should result in a decrease in REC prices in this framework.  Similarly, the empirical 
analysis presented here does not find a relationship between Algonquin Hub natural gas 
prices and REC prices in either state.  Berry (2002) hypothesized that REC prices should 
represent the cost premium of renewable generation over conventional sources, i.e. REC 
prices should respond negatively to positive natural gas price shocks.   
Mixed evidence is found regarding the question of whether REC prices are 
integrated across states.  The trace test of Johansen (1991) resulted in one cointegrating 
vector characterizing the long run relationship between the four endogenous price series.  
However, statistical tests show both the MA and CT Class I REC prices are excluded 
from the cointegrating space and do not respond to disruptions in the long run 
relationship.  An asymmetric relationship between MA and CT Class I REC prices is 
found as well.  The question of whether Massachusetts REC prices drive Connecticut 
REC prices, or vice versa, is sensitive to the specification of causal flows in the DAG.   
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Several explanations for the disparity between theory and the empirical evidence 
are discussed.  The relative immaturity of the REC markets may be contributing to the 
divergence between REC price fundamentals and actual market outcomes.  In addition, 
institutional interventions are continuously altering the market landscape, potentially 
affecting the expectations of market participants, increasing uncertainty, and disrupting 
market fundamentals.  Transaction costs may be large in these markets; potentially 
hindering integration between REC markets in Massachusetts and Connecticut.  Lastly, 
the inelasticity of the market demand curve for RECs can encourage large renewable 
producers to withhold production of RECs and alter price discovery. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards have been promoted and implemented as market-
based incentives for encouraging renewable generation.  As this study has shown, 
markets for RECs in Massachusetts and Connecticut do not behave according to 
hypothesized fundamentals.  Regardless of the reason for this divergence, regulators 
have not succeeded in creating an efficient, fundamental-driven market under current 
RPS programs in the two states. 
Overall, the main contribution of this study is that it provides data-driven results 
testing the hypothesized negative relationships between REC and electricity prices, and 
REC and natural gas prices, in addition to examining the link between REC prices across 
states.  Empirical investigation into these issues has been lacking in the literature.  The 
results of this analysis do not align with theory previously introduced in the literature; 
several reasons are presented as to why this is the case.   
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One limitation of this study is the relatively short time frame for which data is 
available.  Additionally, only two states are included; there are RPS programs in many 
other states.  Taking the results from this study and previous studies indicates that REC 
markets may still be in their infancy.  It appears transaction costs are large in the market.  
The sensitivity of the estimated relationship between REC prices in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, along with the finding that the two prices are not part of the estimated 
cointegrating relationship, suggests that these REC markets have not matured to the 
point of being efficient.   A limited number of transactions may be restricting market 
integration.  Future empirical investigation into RPS programs and REC pricing 
mechanisms is required as programs mature and data becomes available. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROJECTING IMPACTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN 
THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR: EVIDENCE FROM A DATA-RICH 
APPROACH 
 
In August 2015, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a 
heavily anticipated final rule for reducing the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
from fossil-fuel run electricity generating plants (U.S. EPA 2015b).   This rule provides 
guidelines for achieving a reduction in nationwide CO2 emission levels in the electric 
utility sector of approximately 32% from 2005 levels by 2030.  The World Resources 
Institute (2014) posits that emissions reductions and economic growth can be achieved 
simultaneously.  On the other hand, the Institute for 21
st
 Century Energy estimates that 
U.S. GDP will average $51 billion less per year in the EPA regulation case than in the 
base case (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2014).  This chapter contributes to the literature 
by addressing how the EPA rule (Clean Power Plan or CPP) may impact the U.S. 
economy, using a dynamic, data-rich model, the factor-augmented vector autoregression 
(FAVAR).  The empirical analysis serves as a data-driven complement to structural 
analyses of policy changes in the energy and electricity sectors (Burtraw et al. 2014; 
Bushnell et al. 2014; Electric Reliability Council of Texas 2015; Harrison et al. 2014; 
Hopkins 2015; U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2014; U.S. EPA 2015c). 
 The FAVAR approach allows for the use of a large number of time-series 
variables, overcoming the need to select a particular subset of variables to represent 
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larger economic activity as required by most time series approaches, commonly referred 
to as the “curse of dimensionality” (Aastveit 2014; Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 2005).  
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005), for example, use 120 macroeconomic time series 
in their application of the FAVAR model in studying the effects of monetary policy.  
Zagaglia (2010) uses 239 different series in his study of oil price dynamics in the context 
of the macroeconomy.  The basic concept of the FAVAR approach is that a small 
number of underlying latent factors can be extracted from a high-dimensional dataset; 
these factors can then be used in a conventional multivariate time series framework 
(vector autoregression) alongside particular variables of interest to examine dynamic 
relationships or to develop forecasts.  
 The objective of this chapter is to estimate the potential implications of the 2015 
EPA Clean Power Plan for the U.S. economy.  Factors are estimated from a large 
number of monthly macroeconomic, financial, and energy related time series 
representing the underlying sources of variation in U.S. economic and energy sector 
activity.  These factors are included in a FAVAR model with nationwide CO2 emissions 
from the electric power sector, U.S. industrial production, and U.S. real personal income 
as the variables of interest.  Expected paths, both conditional and unconditional, are 
presented for U.S. industrial production, real personal income, and CO2 emissions, as 
well as for the factors.  Conditional forecasts based on the CO2 emissions reductions 
path outlined by the CPP are generated from the FAVAR model.  Inferences suggest that 
CO2 emissions reductions and economic growth can be achieved simultaneously, but 
that the regulation will slow growth and increase variability in economic activity. 
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Literature Review 
The vector autoregressive (VAR) framework was introduced and explored in the context 
of econometric analysis by works such as Sargent (1979) and Sims (1980).  The 
advancement of the VAR framework provided a new degree of flexibility to empirical 
analysis in economics; the methodology has been a staple ever since.  As Bernanke, 
Boivin, and Eliasz (2005, p. 398) point out, VAR analysis is an “…antidote to incredible 
identifying restrictions…” that plague economic models, meaning that causal inference 
can be conducted without having to make too many assumptions about the underlying 
model structure.  Sims, Goldfeld, and Sachs (1982) explore the suitability of VAR 
models for policy analysis.  They argue that careful applications of VAR models can be 
useful in making projections on the likely impacts caused by different policy scenarios.  
Sims, Goldfeld, and Sachs (1982) account for policy endogeneity in their model, 
something that had been previously ignored.  Sims (1986) extends this idea, giving 
examples of how a VAR model can be identified in the context of an endogenous policy 
instrument(s).  He argues that VAR models should not be considered inferior to rational 
expectations models, as they can provide useful information for policy analysis without 
relying on assumptions for market structure, behavior, functional form, etc.  Cooley and 
Leroy (1985) motivate the importance of developing a strong economic justification for 
the underlying structure of VAR models.  They contend that identifying a VAR model 
without economic justification leads to unsupportable interpretations of the results. 
 An extension of the VAR framework, the FAVAR, has its foundation in the work 
of Stock and Watson (2002a, 2002b) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).  Stock 
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and Watson (2002a) establish a method for forecasting in which a large number of time 
series predictors are summarized into a much smaller number of latent factors, which 
they call indexes.  The authors use principal components analysis (PCA) to estimate the 
indexes.  Stock and Watson (2002b) use a similar method to construct an array of 
models from 215 predictor series, referring to the extracted factors as diffusion indexes.  
Models making use of the diffusion indexes perform better than alternatives such as 
univariate autoregressive models and VAR models in forecasting exercises for most of 
the eight variables considered.  Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) formally introduce 
the FAVAR structure in the context of the U.S. monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (the dynamic causal effects of shocks to the federal funds rate on various 
measures of economic activity).  They estimate a VAR model using the federal funds 
rate alongside latent factors extracted from a large panel of macroeconomic variables 
(hence the factor-augmented nomenclature).  The authors conclude that the FAVAR 
approach makes use of important information that would otherwise be ignored in a 
smaller-dimension VAR framework. 
The FAVAR model has been applied to a variety of research questions since its 
introduction.  In the monetary policy arena, Mumtaz, Zabczyk, and Ellis (2011) study 
the effects of UK monetary policy and aggregate demand shocks on various measures of 
the UK macroeconomy, including inflation, real activity, and asset prices.  By allowing 
the FAVAR parameters to vary over time, they find that inflation has a much larger 
response to aggregate demand shocks at the beginning of their sample.  Moench (2008) 
uses a FAVAR approach to forecast the U.S. Treasury bond yield curve by building up a 
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term structure model from the dynamics of the short term interest rate.  He finds that the 
ability of the FAVAR model to predict the yield curve outperforms a variety of models, 
including AR, VAR, and several factor-based models previously introduced in the 
literature.  Barnett, Mumtaz, and Theodoridis (2014) compare the forecasting 
performance of a variety of models for UK GDP, inflation, and interest rates.  They find 
that a FAVAR model with time-varying parameters performs best for all three variables 
at longer (four-quarter ahead) forecast horizons.  Vargas-Silva (2008) investigates the 
effects of a monetary policy shock on U.S. housing starts.  He uses the same 120 series 
as in Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) to find that housing starts respond negatively 
to monetary policy shocks.  Gupta and Kabundi (2010) show U.S. house price inflation 
responds negatively to positive monetary policy shocks by using a FAVAR model based 
on 126 quarterly macroeconomic variables.  Apergis, Christou, and Payne (2014) study 
the dynamics of precious metal markets in the context of a FAVAR model.  They find 
that factors related to macroeconomic variables provide information that helps explain 
gold and silver price movements, whereas a stock market factor does not contribute to 
the same extent. 
Ielpo (2015) introduces a method for improving the power of swap yields in 
forecasting policy rates of both the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank.  He 
shows that his method, which corrects for the cyclical premium of yields, outperforms a 
FAVAR approach using the simple yields themselves in empirical examples.  Favero, 
Niu, and Sala (2012) forecast the U.S. yield curve using both no-arbitrage restrictions 
and large information via factor-based methods.  The authors find that large information 
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sets help at longer time horizons for longer maturities, but that no model strictly 
dominates the others in their empirical setting.  Koop (2013) compares the forecasting 
performance of a FAVAR approach with that of several Bayesian shrinkage methods for 
forecasting U.S. GDP, CPI, and the federal funds rate using a large information set.  He 
shows that Bayesian methods using the Minnesota prior tend to outperform the FAVAR 
approach in medium and large VARs.   
In an energy-related application of the FAVAR approach, Zagaglia (2010) makes 
use of a large dimension (239 variables) dataset containing energy, macroeconomic, and 
financial information to forecast crude oil spot and futures prices.  He finds that the 
FAVAR model improves the forecasting ability of time-series models for oil prices over 
two alternative VAR-type models: one including only oil returns and the second 
including only the factors as right-hand side variables.  Building off of this study, 
Ipatova (2014) applies both FAVAR and Factor-Augmented Vector Error Correction 
Model techniques to forecast crude oil futures at different maturities.  Comparing these 
models to a variety of univariate approaches, her findings are similar to Zagaglia (2010) 
that factor-augmented models have superior performance to alternative time series 
models in forecasting oil futures.  Binder et al. (2016) compare various methods for 
factor extraction in terms of forecasting performance for oil price returns.  The authors 
construct separate FAVAR models for each factor extraction method.  The methods 
perform similarly in terms of probabilistic forecasting, but the traditional PCA method is 
shown to outperform the method introduced by Lam and Yao (2012) in deterministic 
forecasts at short horizons (the reverse is true at longer horizons).  Additional results in 
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Binder et al. (2016) suggest that the choice of the number of factors in a FAVAR is an 
equally important matter in developing a FAVAR model for forecasting.  Hong (2012) 
shows that crude oil price shocks are not exogenous in contemporaneous time when 
modeled alongside factors extracted from a large panel of macroeconomic time series.  
He also shows that a FAVAR model outperforms AR models in forecasting oil price 
returns.  Duangnate (2015) investigates the implications of the number of factors 
included in a FAVAR model on probabilistic forecasting performance.  Interested in 
forecasting U.S. natural gas withdrawals, she finds that including estimated factors 
improves forecasting performance, but using too many factors in a FAVAR model may 
have detrimental effects (parsimony is important).  Chevallier (2011) uses factors 
extracted from macroeconomic, financial, and commodities indicators to study the 
reaction of European carbon prices to international shocks represented by the factors in a 
FAVAR model.  
Conditional Forecasting 
In unconditional forecasting, future values of endogenous variables are predicted solely 
using data up until the present.  Conditional forecasting differs in that the future path of 
at least one variable is assumed to be known (Bloor and Matheson 2011).  Forecasts of 
the variables in the system are made given the assumed path of at least one variable 
(often referred to as a scenario).  Conditional forecasts are commonly developed from 
estimated VAR models; early applications used VAR models to make projections of 
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP or inflation, conditional on a future path of 
monetary policy (Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984; Dokko et al. 2011; Jarocinski and 
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Smets 2008; Luciani 2015; Meyer and Zaman 2013; Sims, Goldfeld, and Sachs 1982).  
Giannone et al. (2014) develop forecasts of Euro area short-term inflation conditional on 
different future paths of oil prices and price index determinants, showing that their 
model is useful for scenario analysis.  Clark and McCracken (2014) present tests of 
predictive ability (bias, efficiency, and equal accuracy) for conditional forecasts from a 
variety of estimated models.  Other recent examples of conditional forecasting include 
Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2015), Stock and Watson (2012), Bloor and Matheson 
(2011), and Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010).  These studies generate conditional 
forecasts from several different models to explore monetary policy effects and 
macroeconomic dynamics during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2015) note that there is a lack of investigation 
into conditional forecasting from VAR models for large datasets.  The authors generate 
forecasts, both unconditional and conditional on realized paths of several key variables, 
for a large set of Euro area macroeconomic and financial indicators.  They employ two 
models, one using Bayesian shrinkage methods and the other a dynamic factor model, to 
forecast their 26 variable system.  Additionally, the authors develop a Kalman filter 
based procedure to estimate conditional forecasts for linear systems that can be written 
in a state-space form.  They find that both Bayesian methods and dynamic factor models 
produce accurate unconditional forecasts and reliable scenarios, and that the forecasts 
from each model are very similar.  
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Brief Introduction to the Clean Power Plan 
The Clean Power Plan final rule, officially “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,” was released in 2015 by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA 2015b).  This rule was released 
approximately one year after a proposed version, allowing the EPA to address comments 
and concerns from states, government agencies, utilities, private corporations, and the 
public.  Despite the EPA‟s review of comments, many entities are still strongly opposed 
to the plan and continue to battle its implementation (Hogan 2015; Potts and Zoppo 
2015).
 12,13
   
 The goal of the CPP is to achieve a 32% reduction in nationwide CO2 emissions 
from electric utility generating units by establishing emissions performance rates for 
existing fossil-fuel fired power plants.  In addition, the EPA outlines unique rate- and 
mass-based goals for each state, based on each state‟s current electricity generating mix.  
The EPA has given flexibility to states in the choice of a strategy or combination of 
strategies (emissions taxes, trading programs, incentives for renewables, etc.) to achieve 
these standards.  Each state is required to submit an implementation plan outlining their 
choice and how it will meet the standards.  The CPP not only allows, but encourages 
states to work together to achieve CO2 reductions (U.S. EPA 2015b).  See Burtraw et al. 
(2014), Burtraw, Bushnell, and Munnings (2015), Bushnell et al. (2015), Hogan (2015), 
                                                 
12
 See Potts and Zoppo (2015) for a discussion of the legal issues surrounding the Clean Power Plan and its 
likelihood of being upheld in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
13
 No claims about the legal issues surrounding the Clean Power Plan are made in this study; the sole 
purpose of the study is to evaluate the potential implications of the rule in its current iteration. 
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Michel and Nielsen (2015), and Paul, Palmer, and Woerman (2013) for detailed 
discussions regarding how states can plan for emissions reductions. 
 In establishing the CO2 emissions performance goals for existing electric power 
plants, the EPA established three „building blocks‟ to achieving emissions reductions 
“…that are available to all affected electricity generating units” (U.S. EPA 2015b, p. 
64667).  The blocks are: (1) improving heat efficiency at existing coal-fired plants; (2) 
substituting generation from existing natural gas combined cycle units for generation 
from higher-emitting sources; and (3) substituting generation from zero-emitting sources 
for generation from fossil-fuel units.  The EPA recognizes that CO2 emissions reductions 
may be achieved through other measures, including demand-side energy efficiency 
improvements, and therefore does not require states to use the three building blocks 
exclusively, or even at all, in their implementation plans. 
Under the guidelines set forth by the CPP, the EPA projects annual national CO2 
emissions to be 22-23% below 2005 levels in 2020, 28-29% below in 2025, and 32% 
below in 2030 (U.S. EPA 2015b).  These projections are used to develop scenarios under 
which conditional forecasts are generated in this study.  
Hopkins (2015) compares the findings of six studies that estimate the projected 
impacts of the CPP.  He notes that the studies generally agree on several key points.  
One common theme among the studies is that energy efficiency improvements are the 
most cost-effective way to reduce CO2 emissions and electricity consumption is 
projected to decline as a result under the CPP.  Additionally, the studies project that 
overall cost increases, including costs to electricity consumers, will be manageable.  
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Hopkins (2015) also notes that the studies show decreases in electricity generation from 
coal and that increased generation from renewables and nuclear will help states meet 
CPP goals.  These increases in renewables and nuclear under the CPP, however, are not 
different than what would happen in base case scenarios.  As noted above, this chapter 
serves as a complement to existing structural analyses of impacts to the electricity and 
energy sectors by projecting the impacts of the CPP on larger economic activity in a 
data-rich setting.  
Methodology 
FAVAR Approach 
The FAVAR model uses information from a large number of time series by extracting 
underlying, latent factors which drive variation in the data.  These factors are then 
included in a traditional VAR along with observed variable(s) of interest for which 
forecasting or specific dynamic relationships are desired.  Let     be a large,  -
dimensional panel of time series variables, where each element           contains 
observations of an individual time series over the period        .    Let    be a     
vector of latent factors which describe the information contained in   .  Additionally, let 
   be a    vector of variables of interest.  The relationship between the latent factors 
and observed time series is: 
(4.1)          
     
              
for        .    is an     matrix of factor loadings,    is     matrix of 
coefficients relating    and   , and    is an     vector of mean zero idiosyncratic 
components, or error terms, with diagonal covariance matrix.  No assumptions regarding 
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the magnitude of   and   are needed at this time, however, as Stock and Watson (2002a) 
show, the restriction that        is needed for consistent estimation of the factors.  
The number of information time series must be much greater than the number of latent 
factors plus observed variables of interest.   
 From equation (4.1), both    and    contain information that drives   .  The 
information provided in the observed time series    and    can be utilized to estimate    
in the context of equation (4.1).  The dynamic relationships between the factors (  ) and 
series of interest (  ) are: 
(4.2)     [
  
  
]   ∑   [
    
    
]                                            
where            are             matrices of coefficients relating past 
values of    and    to values at time  , and     is a vector of mean zero innovations with 
covariance matrix  .   
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) present two options for estimating a 
FAVAR, the first of which is a two-step method that initially extracts factors from    
following the PCA procedure used by Stock and Watson (2002a, 2002b).  PCA of the 
informational time series   , t=1,…,T is based on the   largest eigenvalues of its sample 
contemporaneous covariance matrix  ̂     
 
 
∑      ̅      ̅  
 
    (Stock and 
Watson 2002a).  The     column of the loading matrix    in equation (4.1) is 
proportional to the eigenvector corresponding to the     largest eigenvalue of  ̂    . 
From equation (4.1), the estimated factors  ̂  are obtained using least-squares.  In the 
second step, the factors are placed into a VAR model as endogenous series, joining the 
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observable time series of interest.  They also propose a one-step procedure which 
estimates the factors and the FAVAR system simultaneously using a Gibbs sampling 
procedure.  They find any benefits from using the fully parametric one-step procedure 
are small.  For this reason, as well as the relative computational ease of the alternative, 
the two-step procedure is used in this chapter. 
As noted above, equation (4.1) allows both    and    to contain information that 
drives   .  Thus, the multivariate time series    must be adjusted for the linear effect of 
   in some manner.  The following procedure following Binder et al. (2016) is used here.  
Let  ̃      ̂
   , and  ̂
  ( ̂ 
     ̂ 
 ) where   ̂ 
   
 
 
∑     
     
 
 
∑       
      
 
   .  
After this adjustment, the two-step procedure following Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 
(2005) is conducted.  Specifically, in the first step, PCA is carried out on the matrix  ̃  to 
obtain estimates of the factors,  ̂ (equation 4.1).  In the second step, a FAVAR 
specification including  ̂  and    is estimated following equation (4.2), using least-
squares techniques.  
Conditional Forecasting 
This chapter builds on the work of Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2015) by developing 
conditional forecasts from a VAR model for a high-dimensional dataset.  The authors 
use both Bayesian methods and a dynamic factor model to employ the large dataset.  A 
slightly different approach, however, is taken here by applying a FAVAR model to make 
use of the information contained in the large dataset.  The future path of U.S. CO2 
emissions from the electric power sector is assumed known, based on the EPA‟s outlined 
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path under the CPP.
14
  Following the previous section, factors are extracted in the first 
step, and then the FAVAR parameters of equation (4.2) are estimated using OLS.
15
  To 
compute conditional forecasts, first re-write equation (4.2) in terms of its moving-
average (MA) representation: 
(4.3)     [
  
  
]                          
where      are the MA coefficients of the model.  When fixing a future value of an 
endogenous variable the associated forecast error is, by definition, constrained (the 
difference between the constrained value and the unconditional forecast is set) 
(Robertson and Tallman 1999).  The  -step ahead forecast error of [
    
    
] with forecast 
origin     is: 
(4.4)     ∑         
   
    .         
In effect, by constructing a conditional forecast, linear constraints are placed on the 
innovations              . 
 As explained in Chapters II and III, the innovations    are, in general, non-
orthogonal (      
      is not a diagonal matrix).  It is often beneficial to consider the 
„orthogonalized‟ innovations, as the co-movement of the endogenous variables over time 
                                                 
14
 CO2 emissions are treated as the policy variable for which future values are constrained in this 
forecasting exercise. The implication is that CO2 emissions shocks are assumed to generate the same 
response of economic activity whether emissions levels are set by policy or not.  Sims, Goldfeld and Sachs 
(1982) and Sims (1986) argue that this implication is solely a cautionary reality, not a rejection, of using 
forecasting models in policy analysis.  Bessler and Kling (1989, p. 504) expound upon this point by noting 
that “one should be careful in his/her use of an econometric model where extreme values of the policy 
variables are considered.”    
15
 Clark and McCracken (2014), using Monte Carlo experiments, find little difference between the 
conditional forecasting performance of VARs estimated via Bayesian methods and those estimated via 
OLS.   
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needs to be taken into account.  In computing the conditional forecasts, orthogonal 
innovations following a Bernanke (1986) ordering are used.  Correlated innovations    
are written as a function of the underlying orthogonal sources of variation,   :  
(4.5)         
     .              
As in Chapters II and III, a form for the matrix   is obtained through causal flow 
methods (Pearl 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000), specifically the GES 
algorithm (Chickering 2003) in TETRAD V (2015). 
 Using orthogonalized innovations, the forecast error in equation (4.4) is re-
written as: 
(4.6)     ∑    
        
   
    .             
The linear constraints on the innovations are: 
(4.7)                     
where   is a vector of the orthogonalized innovations               (forecast period 
errors),   is a vector of differences between the known path of the constrained variable 
and its unconstrained forecast values, and   is a matrix relating elements of   to  .  To 
generate conditional forecasts, the vector   which minimizes     subject to the 
constraint in equation (4.7) is found.  The solution to this minimization problem is:  
(4.8)      ̂                     
(Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984; Van der Knoop 1987).  The solution can be thought of 
as the set of innovations to the FAVAR that best meet the conditioned path for the 
constrained variable(s) according to the least-squares criterion (Clark and McCracken 
2014).  Conditional forecasts of the unconstrained endogenous variables are constructed 
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by modifying unconditional forecasts with the elements of  ̂  (Robertson and Tallman 
1999).  Waggoner and Zha (1999) developed a Gibbs sampling technique for efficiently 
computing the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of innovations 
(extended by Jarocinski 2010).  Clark and McCracken (2014) find that conditional 
forecasts are not affected when using the algorithm of Wagooner and Zha (1999) instead 
of Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984).   
Data 
The model is estimated using monthly data for the period July 1976 to December 2014, 
giving 462 observations.  As previously noted, three observed series of interest are 
included in   : U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from the electric power sector (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2015a), U.S. industrial production index 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research 2015), and U.S. real personal 
income (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research 2015).  Based on 
monthly data availability, industrial production and real personal income are chosen to 
represent producer and consumer welfare.  The informational time series, matrix   , 
contains monthly observations of 166 variables including macroeconomic and financial 
indicators, stock indices and share prices, and energy prices and quantities (Appendix 
C).  Macroeconomic data comprises employment indicators, consumer and producer 
price indices, consumption measures, housing indicators, and production and 
manufacturing indices.  Financial data includes government and corporate bond rates, 
stock market indices, and share prices of major energy firms.  Energy data includes 
generation totals from various fuel sources, fuel prices, electricity prices, natural gas and 
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crude oil drilling and shipment activity, electricity sales to different sectors, gas and 
petroleum product stocks, and energy production and consumption measures from 
various sources and sectors. 
All data series are in natural logarithms for the analysis, except those that are in 
terms of percentages.  The PCA procedure requires stationarity of each of the individual 
components of    for estimation of the factors (Stock and Watson 2002b; Moench 2008; 
Aastveit 2014; Tsay 2014).  Each of the variables is transformed to a stationary process 
before any of the modeling procedure is undertaken (Appendix C).  Additionally, all data 
series are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance as an initial pre-adjustment 
following Moench (2008).   
Results 
Model Specification 
Bai and Ng (2002) develop a formal selection procedure for determining the number of 
factors ( ) in the factor model of equation (4.1) based on information criteria.  As noted 
by Duangnate (2015), the estimated number of factors can vary heavily across 
information criteria in empirical applications.  The number of factors in this chapter 
ranges from 1-20 across the seven information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) 
(table 4.1).  Moench (2008) and Zagaglia (2010) discuss the importance of considering 
parsimony when determining the number of factors to include in a FAVAR model.  
Additionally, Duangnate (2015) finds forecasting performance may decline when the 
number of factors included in a FAVAR model increases.  For these reasons, four factors 
are included in the FAVAR model.  The optimal lag order ( ) considered in the FAVAR 
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model (equation 4.2) is 12, based on the minimum value of the AIC loss metric (table 
4.2).  Twelve lags are chosen to help capture the seasonal behavior that is characteristic 
of the electricity sector.  The remaining results are based on an estimated FAVAR 
specification with     factors and      lags. 
 
Table 4.1. Bai and Ng (2002) Information Criteria for Selecting Number of Factors
1 
Criterion Number of Factors 
IC1 20 
IC2 14 
IC3 20 
AIC1 20 
BIC1 20 
AIC3 20 
BIC3 1 
1
Maximum number of factors allowed in the computation of the information criteria is 
20. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Optimal Lag Order Selection for the FAVAR 
Lags SIC AIC HQ 
0 9.28 9.28 9.28 
1 1.53 1.09 1.28 
2 1.37 0.49 0.84 
3 1.18 -0.14 0.39 
4 0.93 -0.82 -0.12 
5 1.24 -0.96 -0.08 
6 1.37 -1.27 -0.23 
7 1.81 -1.27 -0.06 
8 2.28 -1.23 0.14 
9 2.71 -1.24 0.32 
10 3.03 -1.37 0.37 
11 3.19 -1.64 0.26 
12 3.37 -1.89 0.18 
13 3.83 -1.88 0.37 
14 4.32 -1.83 0.59 
15 4.81 -1.78 0.82 
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Properties of the Factors 
It is important to develop an interpretation for the estimated factors to provide economic 
intuition to the FAVAR model and the ensuing forecasts.  To provide a sense of the 
information contained in the factors, each estimated factor is regressed on each 
individual component of the large informational time series   .  The ten largest  
  
values for each factor are reported in tables 4.3-4.6.  All 167    values for each factor 
are charted in figures 4.1-4.4, with the individual components of    grouped into 10 
categories.   Factor 1 appears to be heavily related to macroeconomic indicators, 
particularly consumer price indices, personal consumption, and labor force measures 
(table 4.3 and figure 4.1).  Additionally, Factor 1 is correlated with electricity generation 
from (and consumption of) coal and petroleum in the electric power sector, end-use 
electricity sales, and stocks of crude oil and other petroleum products (figure 4.1).  
Factor 2 is related to crude oil prices, both imported and domestic, as well as producer 
price and manufacturing indices (table 4.4 and figure 4.2).  Factor 3 is also correlated 
with various oil price measures, but additionally relates to capacity utilization in the oil 
and gas extraction and manufacturing industries (table 4.5 and figure 4.3).  Finally, 
Factor 4 is related to natural gas storage activity, total and primary energy consumption 
in the commercial and residential sectors, and petroleum product stocks (table 4.6 and 
figure 4.4). 
 The proportion of total variance in    explained by each of the first four factors 
is also displayed in tables 4.3-4.6.  The proportion of variance explained by      
      is given by    ∑   
 
    where    is the  
   largest eigenvalue of  ̂     (the  
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Table 4.3. Variance Explained by Factor 1 and Ten Highest    Values from 
Regressing Factor 1 on Individual Components of   
1
 
18.0% of total variance
2
  
Series Description    
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Services 0.932 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items less medical care 0.931 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items 0.929 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Commodities 0.927 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items less shelter 0.926 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Transportation 0.908 
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services 0.902 
All Employees: Education & Health Services 0.883 
Consumer Price Index: All Items Less Food & Energy 0.883 
Civilian Labor Force 0.873 
1
    values are from the regressions  ̂          for           
2 
Percentage of variance in    explained by Factor 1. 
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Table 4.4. Variance Explained by Factor 2 and Ten Highest    Values from 
Regressing Factor 2 on Individual Components of   
1
 
6.7% of total variance
2 
 
Series Description    
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, Composite 0.385 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, Imported 0.379 
Producer Price Index: Supplies &   Components 0.376 
Landed Cost of Crude Oil Imports 0.371 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, Domestic 0.369 
Crude Oil Domestic First Purchase Price 0.369 
Free on Board Cost of Crude Oil Imports 0.363 
Producer Price Index by Commodity for Finished Consumer Goods 0.307 
Producer Price Index by Commodity for Finished Goods 0.282 
ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index© 0.203 
1
    values are from the regressions  ̂          for           
2 
Percentage of variance in    explained by Factor 2. 
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Table 4.5. Variance Explained by Factor 3 and Ten Highest    Values from 
Regressing Factor 3 on Individual Components of   
1
 
5.3% of total variance
2 
 
Series Description    
Crude Oil Domestic First Purchase Price 0.322 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, Composite 0.320 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, Imported 0.312 
Landed Cost of Crude Oil Imports 0.311 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil, Domestic 0.310 
Free on Board Cost of Crude Oil Imports 0.302 
Capacity Utilization: Oil and gas extraction 0.278 
Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing (NAICS) 0.263 
Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing (SIC) 0.251 
Capacity Utilization: Total Industry 0.242 
1
    values are from the regressions  ̂          for           
2 
Percentage of variance in    explained by Factor 3. 
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Table 4.6. Variance Explained by Factor 4 and Ten Highest    Values from 
Regressing Factor 4 on Individual Components of   
1
 
5.1% of total variance
2 
 
Series Description    
Natural Gas Storage Activity, Injections 0.528 
Natural Gas Storage Activity, Withdrawals 0.459 
Liquefied Petroleum Gases Stocks 0.384 
Total Energy Consumed by the Residential Sector 0.373 
Electricity Retail Sales to the Industrial Sector 0.250 
Total Energy Consumed by the Commercial Sector 0.231 
Distillate Fuel Oil Stocks 0.218 
Hydroelectric Power Consumption 0.213 
Electricity Net Generation From Conventional Hydroelectric Power 0.212 
Natural Gas in Underground Storage, Total 0.200 
1
    values are from the regressions  ̂          for           
2 
Percentage of variance in    explained by Factor 4. 
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Figure 4.1. Chart of    values from regressing Factor 1 on individual components of    
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Figure 4.2. Chart of    values from regressing Factor 2 on individual components of    
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Figure 4.3. Chart of    values from regressing Factor 3 on individual components of    
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Figure 4.4. Chart of    values from regressing Factor 4 on individual components of    
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contemporaneous covariance matrix of   ) (Tsay 2014).  Factor 1 accounts for the 
largest portion of variance in    (18%), while the first four factors together explain 35% 
of the total variance in   . 
Contemporaneous Causality 
The Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) generated by the GES algorithm is presented in 
figure 4.5.  The DAG is used to provide the causal ordering for innovations in the 
FAVAR (matrix   in equations 4.5 and 4.6).  Contemporaneous causal flows are present 
from industrial production innovations to real personal income and to Factor 1.  
Additional flows exist from Factors 1 and 2 to real personal income.  There are also 
contemporaneous information flows from Factors 1 and 3 to Factor 2 and from Factor 2 
and CO2 to Factor 4.
16
 
Forecasting Results 
Unconditional and conditional forecasts are constructed for the seven variables in the 
FAVAR (CO2 emissions, industrial production, real personal income, and Factors 1-4).  
Out-of-sample forecasts from January 2015 to December 2030 are graphed in figures 
4.6-4.12.  The constraints placed on the forecast period are that monthly CO2 emissions 
levels in the electric power sector must be 22% below corresponding monthly 2005 
levels in the year 2020, 28% below 2005 levels in 2025, and 32% below 2005 levels in 
                                                 
16
 As noted by Demiralp and Hoover (2003), graphical methods for detecting contemporaneous causality 
in VARs generally perform well in identifying the skeleton of a causal structure, but do not always 
identify the direction of causal arrows correctly.  Prior beliefs or additional statistical information may be 
used to supplement graphical algorithms.  For this reason, in addition to the causal structure outlined in 
Figure 4.5, forecasts are generated from a model where the direction of flow from CO2 to Factor 4 is 
reversed (i.e. Factor 4 to CO2).  Forecasting results are robust to this specification (industrial production 
has 3.97% annual growth in the conditional case and 3.92% annual growth in the unconditional case; real 
personal income 3.27% and  3.43%). 
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Figure 4.5. Directed Acyclic Graph for contemporaneous causal flows among 
contemporaneous innovations from the FAVAR 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Forecasts of CO2 emissions levels from the electric power sector  
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Figure 4.7. Forecasts of U.S. industrial production index  
 
 
 
 Figure 4.8. Forecasts of U.S. real personal income 
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Figure 4.9. Forecasts of Factor 1 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Forecasts of Factor 2 
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Figure 4.11. Forecasts of Factor 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Forecasts of Factor 4 
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2030, for a total of 36 linear constraints in equation 4.7.  The set of forecast period 
innovations that best meet this path for CO2 emission reductions are computed and used 
to construct the conditional forecasts.  Confidence intervals for the conditional forecasts 
are constructed by simulating 1,000 draws from the distribution of forecasts under the 
constrained path of CO2 emissions.  The 16
th
 and 84
th
 percentiles of the distribution are 
displayed in figures 4.6-4.12 (approximately one standard deviation from the mean, 
assuming normally distributed innovations) (Estima 2013).  Checks for sensitivity are 
conducted by varying the constraints in numerous ways, including gradually increasing 
the CO2 emissions reductions in each year of the forecast period, only keeping the 
constraint in the last year (2030), and both shortening and lengthening the forecast 
period by five years.  Inferences based on comparing conditional and unconditional 
forecasts are approximately the same across the sensitivity checks. 
 The forecasts for CO2 emissions provide a visualization of the constraint (figure 
4.6).  The mean of the conditional forecast for CO2 emissions is the same as the 16
th
 and 
84
th
 percentiles of the distribution in 2020, 2025, 2030; this is a direct implication of 
imposing the constraints as described.  Also of note is that the solution to the 
minimization problem (equation 4.8) corresponds to a steady decrease in CO2 emissions, 
rather than large drops in the years in which the constraint is imposed.  Lastly, both the 
conditional and unconditional forecasts for CO2 emissions are characterized by seasonal 
patterns that are present in the electric power industry. 
 Industrial production is projected to be lower in the CPP CO2 emissions 
reduction scenario than in the unconditional case over most of the forecast period (figure 
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4.7).  The maximum difference between the two forecasts occurs in late 2024 when the 
mean conditional industrial production forecast is 8% lower than the unconditional 
forecast.  Unconditional and conditional forecasts for industrial production converge by 
the end of the forecast period.  The average annual growth rate over the entire forecast 
period, therefore, is equal in the conditional and unconditional cases (3.9%).  The 
average annual growth rate for 2015 to 2025, however, is 4.4% in the unconditional case 
and 3.3% in the conditional case.  Additionally, the upper confidence band for the 
conditional forecast is near or below the unconditional forecast from 2017 to 2025.  
After 2025, the unconditional forecast falls within the confidence bands for the 
conditional forecast.  Variance of the industrial production forecast is three percent 
lower in the conditional case than the unconditional. 
The forecasted path of real personal income is projected to be lower in the 
conditional case than in the unconditional over the entire forecast period.  The mean 
conditional forecast for real personal income reaches a maximum difference of 4.1% 
lower than the unconditional forecast in late 2025 and is 1.7% lower at the end of the 
forecast period.  On average, real personal income is projected to grow 3.3% per year in 
the CPP scenario and 3.5% per year in the unconditional case.  However, the upper 
confidence band of the conditional forecast for real personal income is slightly above the 
unconditional forecast for the entire forecast period.  The variance of the conditional 
forecast of real personal income is 17% lower than the unconditional forecast. 
 The conditional forecast of Factor 1 tracks the unconditional forecast closely 
over the first half of the forecast period, but falls below the unconditional forecast 
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around late 2021 and remains below for the rest of the forecast period.  The gap between 
the two forecasts increases over this time frame; in fact, the upper confidence band for 
the conditional forecast is below the unconditional forecast by the end of the forecast 
period.  The variance of the conditional forecast of Factor 1 is 200% higher than that of 
the unconditional forecast.  The forecast results imply that the CO2 emissions scenario 
will have a negative impact (in comparison with the unconditional case) on Factor 1, and 
that additional volatility may be present.  Recall, Factor 1 is highly correlated with 
various consumer price indices, consumption, labor force measures, electric generation 
from fossil fuels, and end-use electricity sales.  These economic indicators and energy 
measures may be negatively impacted by the CPP in the second half of the forecast 
period. 
 Factor 2 is forecasted to be slightly lower under the conditional case than the 
unconditional case for the majority of the forecast period, with a 75% increase in 
variance in the conditional case.  Conditional forecasts of Factor 3 are projected slightly 
above unconditional forecasts in the beginning third of the forecast period, and slightly 
below the unconditional forecasts in the final third of the forecast period.  The variance 
of the two forecasts for Factor 3 are approximately equal (0.2% difference).  As Factors 
2 and 3 are both most related to crude oil price measures, the impact of the CPP on oil 
price measures is ambiguous.  The forecasts for Factor 3 imply that capacity utilization 
in the manufacturing and oil and gas extraction industries could initially be positively 
impacted by the CPP scenario, with this effect reversing in the latter third of the forecast 
period.  The conditional forecast of Factor 4 tracks the unconditional forecast closely, 
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however with increased volatility in the conditional case (63% increase in variance).  
This result suggests that the CPP could result in more volatile natural gas storage activity 
and total energy consumption. 
Conclusions 
Conditional forecasts are developed using information from a dynamic, data-rich 
environment.  Previous applications have focused on Bayesian methods or dynamic 
factor models to conduct conditional forecasting or scenario analysis using large 
datasets.  In this chapter, a FAVAR model is used to employ a large multivariate time 
series dataset, with the purpose of examining the potential impacts of the U.S. EPA‟s 
goal to reduce CO2 emissions from the electric power sector.  The conditional 
forecasting exercise uses the projected reductions in CO2 emissions outlined by the 
EPA‟s Clean Power Plan to fix a path for one of the endogenous variables in the 
FAVAR model (electric power sector CO2 emissions).  Differences between conditional 
and unconditional forecasts are examined as potential impacts of U.S. policy to reduce 
CO2 emissions. 
 The issue of whether climate policy will positively or negatively impact 
economic growth is an important consideration as the U.S. moves forward with 
implementation of the CPP.  Results of this study suggest that both U.S. real personal 
income and industrial production will initially see lower growth under the CPP CO2 
emissions reduction scenario than in the unconditional case.  Growth in real personal 
income will continue to be lower in the conditional case than the unconditional case over 
the entire forecast period.  Interestingly, the conditional forecast of industrial production 
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converges to the unconditional forecast at the end of the forecast period.  A possible 
explanation of this feature is that the economy will show resiliency in adjusting to the 
CO2 emissions constraint.  This is only speculation, however, and further research into 
the convergence of these forecasts is required to determine its source. 
Forecasts of the first factor show that coal and petroleum use in the electric 
power sector may be negatively impacted by the CPP.  This result is consistent with 
other studies and the idea that reduction in coal-fired generation is an easy and cost-
effective way to achieve emissions reductions (Hogan 2015; U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce 2014).  Additionally, end-use electricity sales may be lower under the CPP 
scenario than in the unconditional case (consistent with Hopkins 2015).  Price levels, 
personal consumption, and labor force measures may be negatively impacted as well.  
Increased volatility under the CPP is also possible for the variables associated with 
Factor 1.  Factor 2 and 3 forecasts suggest the projected impact of the CPP on various 
crude oil price levels is ambiguous.  The Factor 4 forecasts suggest the potential for 
increased volatility in natural gas storage activity and overall energy consumption. 
Generally, the forecasting exercise shows little difference between unconditional 
and conditional forecasts of the variables in the early part of the forecast period, 
suggesting that impacts of the CPP are small while the constraints are less stringent.   
Results also suggest substantial increases in the variance of forecasts for Factors 1 and 4 
under the CPP scenario.  Both economic and energy sector activity are projected to be 
more volatile under the CPP.  Additionally, confidence intervals for the conditional 
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forecasts show a high level of uncertainty as the intervals overlap with the unconditional 
forecast for many of the variables. 
 Overall, the results of this study suggest that economic activity may grow more 
slowly under CPP implementation than it would otherwise; however, economic growth 
and CO2 reductions can be achieved simultaneously.  The results serve as a data-driven 
complement to structural analyses of policy change in the energy sector.  Future research 
into climate policy can be improved by continued investigation into methods that 
employ information from large datasets. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The U.S. energy sector is continuously evolving amidst regulatory changes, 
technological innovations, and shifts in market conditions.  Given this constantly 
changing environment, it is imperative to improve our understanding of the dynamics in 
which the U.S. energy sector operates.  The overall objective of this dissertation is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the past, present, and future of U.S. energy 
market dynamics and interactions with policy by: (1) characterizing market relationships 
and investigating the consequences of past regulatory changes and shifts in market 
conditions; (2) examining current program functionality; and (3) projecting the impacts 
of future policy implementation.   
 To achieve this overall objective, gaps present in energy-related economics 
literature are addressed by examining three related issues associated with the electric 
power sector.  Advancements in multivariate time series analysis are employed.  First, 
inventory management of inputs in the energy sector has received little attention in the 
literature.  Addressing this deficiency, long-term past inventory management behavior is 
characterized in Chapter II by examining coal inventories at U.S. electric power plants.  
Specific objectives are to investigate how coal inventories are related to movements in 
economic factors and to determine whether these relationships have remained constant 
over time.  Next, market-based tradable right programs have received considerable 
attention; however, there is a lack of empirical examination of the performance of such 
programs, especially Renewable Portfolio Standards (Felder 2011; Fischer 2010).  This 
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gap in the literature is addressed in Chapter III by exploring the pricing dynamics of 
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) with the goal of improving our understanding of the 
functionality of currently existing RPS programs.  Finally, there has been speculation 
about the potential economic impacts of reducing U.S. CO2 emissions through the Clean 
Power Plan.  A data-rich time series approach, which is lacking in the energy policy 
literature, is used to estimate the potential impacts of emissions reductions on economic 
and energy sector activity in Chapter IV. 
 Overall, results suggest that changes in the regulatory environment have had and 
will continue to have important implications for the electric power sector.  The sector, 
however, has exhibited adaptability to past regulatory changes and is projected to remain 
resilient in the future.   
Energy Market Relationships: Past Changes in Regulation and Market Conditions 
While studies concerning inventory management are relatively abundant, most previous 
studies pertain to optimal stocking of finished goods (Arrow et al. 1951; Blinder 1986; 
Feldstein et al. 1976; Holt, Modigliani, and Simon 1955), and not input inventory 
management.  Further, very few studies investigate inventory behavior in the energy 
sector, especially the electric power sector.  This gap in the literature is addressed by 
examining the response of coal (input) inventories at U.S. electric power plants to 
movements in economic factors.  Past regulatory changes have had implications for the 
profitability of firms in the electric power sector, as shown by Jha (2015), who finds that 
U.S. electric power plants that face deregulated electricity markets save approximately 
3% per month in coal procurement and storage costs compared to regulated plants.  A 
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test for stability of the long run parameters in a vector error correction model following 
Hansen and Johansen (1999) is employed in Chapter II to determine whether long run, 
dynamic relationships governing coal inventory behavior have remained constant over 
time.  There is a lack of empirical applications of tests for structural breaks in the long 
run relationships estimated in vector error correction models.  This dissertation provides 
an economically intuitive setting for an application of the Hansen and Johansen (1999) 
test and gives a detailed interpretation of the results. 
Results suggest two sustained periods of instability in the long run relationships, 
the first from mid-1981 to mid-1986, and the second from mid-1994 to mid-2001.  The 
first period of instability follows the implementation of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.  
This Act, which altered railroad industry practices and rates, is one likely cause of this 
initial period of instability in the long run relationships among the variables.  The second 
period of instability is preceded by and contains several major regulatory changes in the 
natural gas and electric power sectors, including the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the introduction of NAFTA, the unbundling of 
natural gas sales and transportation, and deregulation of the electric power sector.  
Following the second period of instability, the long run relationships remain constant for 
the rest of the sample.  This latter period of stability in the sample includes two major 
shocks to energy markets (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and the onset of the U.S. 
shale boom in the mid-to-late 2000s).  Taken together, these results suggest that the 
fluctuating regulatory environment of the 1990s was a larger source of instability in the 
inventory behavior of electric generating firms than the shifts in market conditions of the 
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mid-to-late 2000s.  Policy makers should be aware that altering the regulatory 
environment can cause considerable fluctuations in how firms‟ inventory decisions 
interact with input and output markets and opportunity costs in the long run. 
Current Program Functionality 
The academic literature is also lacking empirical studies of the performance of 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) (Fischer 2011; Felder 2010).  RPS programs have 
been implemented by the majority of U.S. states as market-based, tradable rights 
mechanisms to encourage increased electric generation from renewable sources.  To the 
author‟s knowledge, there have been no empirical investigations into the pricing 
dynamics of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).  A multivariate time series approach is 
taken in this dissertation, using data from Massachusetts and Connecticut to examine if 
REC pricing relationships behave as theorized in the literature. 
Relationships among Renewable Energy Credit prices in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, electricity prices, and natural gas prices are estimated using a vector error 
correction model.  Results indicate that REC prices do not behave as previously 
theorized in the literature.  Several reasons for the disparity between theory and the 
empirical evidence are presented, including the relative immaturity of the markets and 
continuous regulatory intervention in the marketplace.  Although RPS programs have 
been promoted as market-based incentives for renewable generation, the analysis 
suggests that policy-makers have not succeeded in creating a fundamental-driven market 
for RECs in Massachusetts or Connecticut.  
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Projecting Impacts of Future Policy Implementation 
There has been speculation about the potential impacts of the recently introduced Clean 
Power Plan (CPP) (Hopkins 2015; U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2014; World Resources 
Institute 2014).  This dissertation complements the growing literature in this area by 
offering a data-rich approach to estimate the impacts of the CPP on economic activity.  
To accomplish this, a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach which 
has been utilized in the monetary policy and macroeconomic literature (Bernanke, 
Boivin, and Eliasz 2005; Ielpo 2015; Moench 2008), but less so in energy-related 
applications (Chevallier 2011; Zagaglia 2010), is employed.  The FAVAR approach 
makes use of the information in a large dataset to project the impacts of CO2 emissions 
reductions outlined by the CPP.  Another gap in the literature is noted by Banbura, 
Giannone, and Lenza (2015), who point out that there is a lack of investigation into 
developing conditional forecasts from vector autoregressive models for large datasets.  
This dissertation contributes to this gap in the literature by constructing conditional 
forecasts from a FAVAR model. 
The effect of reducing CO2 emissions in the electric power sector is quantified by 
developing conditional forecasts from a FAVAR model for a large macroeconomic and 
energy-related dataset.  Results suggest that growth in real personal income will be 
slower under the CPP than it would be otherwise.  Additionally, growth in U.S. 
industrial production will be lower under the CPP over the majority of the forecast 
period, but the constrained forecast for industrial production converges to the forecast 
not constrained by CO2 emissions at the end of the period (suggesting a level of 
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economic resiliency to CO2 emissions reductions).  Forecasts of the factors show that 
factors related to coal and petroleum consumption, electricity sales, overall price levels, 
and personal consumption will be negatively impacted and see increased volatility under 
the CPP.  Additionally, increased volatility in factors related to natural gas storage 
activity and overall energy consumption is forecasted under the CPP.  Overall inference 
is that economic activity may grow more slowly under CPP implementation than it 
would otherwise; however, economic growth and CO2 emissions reductions can be 
achieved simultaneously. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis conducted in this 
dissertation, and by doing so areas for continued research become apparent.  As noted 
previously, the test for parameter constancy (Hansen and Johansen 1999) conducted in 
Chapter II has not been used extensively in empirical applications.  The test does not 
result in a specific breakpoint in the parameters, such as that of Bai and Perron (2003).  
The interpretation of the test results is not concrete and requires further investigation to 
develop meaningful inference.  Additionally, the power of the test appears to be affected 
by the specification of number of lags and cointegrating vectors in the vector error 
correction model.  Studies concerning further exploration of these issues are a suggestion 
for future research.   
 Data quality and availability is a limitation of the research in Chapter III.  REC 
pricing data is relatively sparse and not readily available.  Only two states are considered 
(Massachusetts and Connecticut), while there are RPS programs in 29 states.  The 
 134 
 
sample size considered in the empirical analysis is only a short snapshot of the history of 
RPS programs in these states.  Future empirical research into the performance of RPS 
programs is required as data becomes available.  Application of methods to handle 
sparse data and immature markets may be an inviting avenue of future research into RPS 
programs.  Additionally, there may be some degree of influence of the market for CO2 
permits traded under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  Future research 
into the links between RPS programs and the RGGI in northeastern states will be 
beneficial. 
 The research conducted in Chapter IV is a high-level, purely data-driven analysis 
of the impacts of the Clean Power Plan.  The analysis is meant to serve as a complement 
to more structural, bottom-up models of energy sector policy and economic activity, 
rather than a complete, definitive impact analysis of the CPP.  Additionally, monthly 
data for U.S. GDP is not available for the entire sample period considered.  As such, 
industrial production and real personal income were chosen to represent larger economic 
activity and serve as proxies for producer and consumer welfare.  Future research is 
required to determine why forecasts for industrial production (unconditional and 
conditional) converge at the end of the forecast period. 
 Selection of the number of factors to include in a FAVAR model has been shown 
to have important implications for forecasting performance (Duangnate 2015; Binder et 
al. 2016).  A balance between the information criteria approach of Bai and Ng (2002) 
and the desire for parsimony in VAR models is a common discussion in the FAVAR 
literature (Moench 2008; Zagaglia 2010).  Research into the effect of the number of 
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factors on conditional forecasting performance and scenario analysis is left for future 
exploration. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Graphs of the sequence of test statistics   
   
 for all 26 two, three, four, and five variable 
subsets of the five endogenous series (Chapter II). 
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7. Coal Inv, Coal, NG 
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  is full rank  
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14. Coal, NG, Bonds 
 
15. Coal, Elec, Bonds 
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Recursive estimation unable to converge. 
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21. Coal, NG  
 
22. Coal, Elec  
  is full rank 
 
23. Coal, Bonds 
 
24. NG, Elec  
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25. NG, Bonds 
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Figure A.2. Hansen and Johansen (1999) test for parameter stability when current end-
of-month coal on hand is divided by the following month‟s consumption in the previous 
year,            
             
                    
.   
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APPENDIX B 
 
Results of Bai and Perron (2003) and Hansen and Johansen (1999) tests for structural 
break (Chapter III). 
 
  
Table B.1. Bai and Perron (2003) Test for Structural Breaks in a VAR(2) Model  
Series in First Difference Natural Logarithms 
Hypothesis CT Class 
I 
MA Class 
I 
MassHub NG 10% critical 
value 
1 vs. 0 3.54 2.30 0.66 1.51 15.53 
2 vs. 0 4.59 2.47 1.60 1.92 14.65 
3 vs. 0 3.05 2.02 1.29 1.86 13.63 
2|1 4.19 2.26 2.43 2.12 17.54 
3|2 0.56 1.06 0.78 1.47 18.55 
Min BIC (# of 
breaks) 
0 0 0 0  
Series in Natural Logarithms 
Hypothesis CT Class 
I 
MA Class 
I 
MassHub NG 10% critical 
value 
1 vs. 0 2.68 3.63 4.48 3.53 15.53 
2 vs. 0 2.69 4.19 3.56 5.32 14.65 
3 vs. 0 1.88 2.50 2.47 4.45 13.63 
2|1 2.27 3.55 2.04 5.21 17.54 
3|2 0.59 0.17 0.65 1.67 18.55 
Min BIC (# of 
breaks) 
0 0 0 2  
Note: Minimum span allowed between breaks set to 15 observations. 
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Figure B.1. Hansen and Johansen (1999) test for parameter constancy in a 
VECM(2) model with one cointegrating vector 
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APPENDIX C 
 
List of all data series used in the Chapter IV analysis. 
  
Series Description Units Source Code
a 
Total Energy Electric Power Sector 
CO2 Emissions 
Million Metric 
Tons of CO2 
EIA 2 
Industrial Production Index Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Real Personal Income Billions of Chained 
2009 Dollars 
FRED 2 
Moody's Corporate Bond AAA Percent FRED 3 
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate 
Bond Minus Federal Funds Rate 
Percent FRED 0 
Average Weekly Hours of Production 
and Nonsupervisory Employees: 
Manufacturing 
Hours FRED 2 
Moody's Corporate Bond BAA Percent FRED 3 
Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate 
Bond Minus Federal Funds Rate 
Percent FRED 0 
Commercial and Industrial Loans, All 
Commercial Banks 
Billions of Dollars FRED 2 
Capacity Utilization: Oil and gas 
extraction 
Percent of Capacity FRED 3 
Capacity Utilization: Durable 
manufacturing 
Percent of Capacity FRED 0 
Capacity Utilization: Nondurable 
manufacturing 
Percent of Capacity FRED 3 
Average Weekly Hours of Production 
and Nonsupervisory Employees: 
Goods-Producing 
Hours FRED 2 
Average Weekly Hours of Production 
and Nonsupervisory Employees: 
Mining and Logging 
Hours FRED 2 
Average Weekly Hours of Production 
and Nonsupervisory Employees: 
Construction 
Hours FRED 2 
Civilian Labor Force Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 0 
Consumer Loans at All Commercial 
Banks 
Billions of Dollars FRED 2 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: All Items 
Index 82-84=100 FRED 1 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Index 82-84=100 FRED 1 
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Consumers: All Items Less Food & 
Energy 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: Transportation 
Index 82-84=100 FRED 1 
Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing 
(SIC) 
Percent of Capacity FRED 0 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: All items less shelter 
Index 82-84=100 FRED 1 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: All items less medical 
care 
Index 82-84=100 FRED 1 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: Commodities 
Index 82-84=100 FRED 1 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: Durables 
Index 82-84=100 FRED 0 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers: Services 
Index 1982-84=100 FRED 1 
Real personal consumption 
expenditures: Goods: Durable goods 
Percent Change 
from Preceding 
Period 
FRED 0 
All Employees: Durable goods Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Real personal consumption 
expenditures 
Percent Change 
from Preceding 
Period 
FRED 0 
Real personal consumption 
expenditures: Services (chain-type 
quantity index) 
Index 2009=100 FRED 2 
Real personal consumption 
expenditures: Services 
Percent Change 
from Preceding 
Period 
FRED 0 
Effective Federal Funds Rate Percent FRED 3 
1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity 
Rate 
Percent FRED 3 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity 
Rate 
Percent FRED 3 
5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity 
Rate 
Percent FRED 3 
Weekly Overtime Hours: 
Manufacturing for the United States 
Hours FRED 2 
Housing Starts: Total: New Privately 
Owned Housing Units Started 
Thousands of Units FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Business 
Equipment 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
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Industrial Production: Consumer 
Goods 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Durable 
Consumer Goods 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Durable 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Durable 
Materials 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Final Products 
(Market Group) 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Manufacturing 
(SIC) 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Materials Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Mining Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Nondurable 
Consumer Goods 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Nondurable 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Nondurable 
Materials 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Industrial Production: Electric and 
Gas Utilities 
Index 2007=100 FRED 2 
Labor Force Participation Rate - 
Black or African American 
Percent FRED 3 
All Employees: Manufacturing Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing 
(NAICS) 
Percent of Capacity FRED 0 
ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite 
Index© 
Index FRED 0 
ISM Manufacturing: Inventories 
Index 
Index FRED 0 
ISM Manufacturing: New Orders 
Index 
Index FRED 0 
All Employees: Nondurable goods Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Total nonfarm Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Personal Consumption Expenditures: 
Services 
Billions of Dollars FRED 1 
Producer Price Index by Commodity 
for Crude Materials for Further 
Processing 
Index 1982=100 FRED 2 
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Producer Price Index by Commodity 
for Finished Consumer Goods 
Index 1982=100 FRED 2 
Producer Price Index by Commodity 
for Finished Goods 
Index 1982=100 FRED 2 
Producer Price Index by Commodity 
Intermediate Materials: Supplies & 
Components 
Index 1982=100 FRED 2 
All Employees: Service-Providing 
Industries 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary 
Market Rate 
Percent FRED 3 
6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary 
Market Rate 
Percent FRED 3 
Capacity Utilization: Total Industry Percent of Capacity FRED 0 
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 
15 to 26 Weeks 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 
27 Weeks and Over 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 
5 to 14 Weeks 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 0 
Number of Civilians Unemployed - 
Less Than 5 Weeks 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Average (Mean) Duration of 
Unemployment 
Weeks FRED 2 
Civilian Unemployment Rate Percent FRED 0 
Production of Total Industry in United 
States 
Index 2010=100 FRED 2 
All Employees: Construction Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Education & Health 
Services 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 1 
All Employees: Financial Activities Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Goods-Producing 
Industries 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Government Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Mining and logging Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Total Private 
Industries 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
All Employees: Trade, Transportation 
& Utilities 
Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
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All Employees: Wholesale Trade Thousands of 
Persons 
FRED 2 
Electricity Net Generation From Coal, 
Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 1 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Petroleum, Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 0 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Natural Gas, Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Nuclear Electric Power, Electric 
Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Conventional Hydroelectric Power, 
Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 0 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Wood, Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Waste, Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Net Generation From 
Geothermal, Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 1 
Electricity Net Generation Total, 
Electric Power Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Coal Stocks, Electric Power Sector Thousand Short 
Tons 
EIA 2 
Total Petroleum Stocks, Electric 
Power Sector 
Thousand Barrels EIA 2 
Natural Gas Storage Activity, 
Withdrawals 
billion cubic feet EIA 2 
Natural Gas Storage Activity, 
Injections 
Billion Cubic Feet EIA 2 
Natural Gas in Underground Storage, 
End of Period, Base Gas 
Billion Cubic Feet EIA 2 
Natural Gas in Underground Storage, 
End of Period, Working Gas 
Billion Cubic Feet EIA 2 
Natural Gas in Underground Storage, 
End of Period, Total 
Billion Cubic Feet EIA 1 
Exxon Mobil Share Price US Dollars DS 2 
BP Share Price US Dollars DS 2 
Conoco Phillips Share Price US Dollars DS 2 
Royal Dutch Shell Share Price  DS 2 
Chevron Share Price US Dollars DS 2 
US 3 month treasury bill  DS 2 
US-DS Oil & Gas  Price Index DS 2 
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DAX 30 Performance Price Index DS 2 
US dollar to GB Pound Exchange Rate DS 2 
UK Industrial Production Index DS 2 
Retail price of electricity $/MWh EIA 2 
Cost of Coal Receipts at Electric 
Generating Plants 
Dollars per Million 
Btu, Including 
Taxes 
EIA 2 
Cost of Natural Gas Receipts at 
Electric Generating Plants 
Dollars per Million 
Btu, Including 
Taxes 
EIA 2 
Crude Oil and Natural Gas Rotary 
Rigs in Operation, Onshore 
Number of Rigs EIA 2 
Crude Oil and Natural Gas Rotary 
Rigs in Operation, Offshore 
Number of Rigs EIA 2 
Crude Oil and Natural Gas Rotary 
Rigs in Operation, Total 
Number of Rigs EIA 2 
Active Well Service Rig Count Number of Rigs EIA 2 
Coal Consumption for Electricity 
Generation and Useful Thermal 
Output, Electric Power Sector 
Thousand Short 
Tons 
EIA 1 
Distillate Fuel Oil Consumption for 
Electricity Generation and Useful 
Thermal Output, Electric Power 
Sector 
Thousand Barrels EIA 0 
Residual Fuel Oil Consumption for 
Electricity Generation and Useful 
Thermal Output, Electric Power 
Sector 
Thousand Barrels EIA 0 
Petroleum Coke Consumption for 
Electricity Generation and Useful 
Thermal Output, Electric Power 
Sector 
Thousand Short 
Tons 
EIA 2 
Total Petroleum Consumption for 
Electricity Generation and Useful 
Thermal Output, Electric Power 
Sector 
Thousand Barrels EIA 0 
Natural Gas Consumption for 
Electricity Generation and Useful 
Thermal Output, Electric Power 
Sector 
Billion Cubic Feet EIA 2 
Wood Consumption for Electricity 
Generation and Useful Thermal 
Output, Electric Power Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
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Waste Consumption for Electricity 
Generation and Useful Thermal 
Output, Electric Power Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Electricity Retail Sales to the 
Residential Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Retail Sales to the 
Commercial Sector 
Million kWh EIA 1 
Electricity Retail Sales to the 
Industrial Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Retail Sales to the 
Transportation Sector 
Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity Retail Sales, Total Million kWh EIA 2 
Electricity End Use, Total Million kWh EIA 2 
Nuclear Electricity Net Generation Million kWh EIA 2 
Nuclear Share of Electricity Net 
Generation 
Percent EIA 3 
Nuclear Generating Units, Capacity 
Factor 
Percent EIA 3 
Crude Oil Domestic First Purchase 
Price 
Dollars per Barrel EIA 2 
Free on Board Cost of Crude Oil 
Imports 
Dollars per Barrel EIA 2 
Landed Cost of Crude Oil Imports Dollars per Barrel EIA 2 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude 
Oil, Domestic 
Dollars per Barrel EIA 2 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude 
Oil, Imported 
Dollars per Barrel EIA 2 
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude 
Oil, Composite 
Dollars per Barrel EIA 2 
Total Biomass Energy Production Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Renewable Energy Production Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Hydroelectric Power Consumption Trillion Btu EIA 0 
Geothermal Energy Consumption Trillion Btu EIA 1 
Wood Energy Consumption Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Waste Energy Consumption Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Biomass Energy Consumption Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Renewable Energy 
Consumption 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Crude Oil Stocks, SPR Million Barrels EIA 0 
Crude Oil Stocks, Non-SPR Million Barrels EIA 2 
Crude Oil Stocks, Total Million Barrels EIA 1 
Distillate Fuel Oil Stocks Million Barrels EIA 0 
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Jet Fuel Stocks Million Barrels EIA 1 
Propane/Propylene Stocks Million Barrels EIA 2 
Liquefied Petroleum Gases Stocks Million Barrels EIA 2 
Motor Gasoline Stocks (Including 
Blending Components and Gasohol) 
Million Barrels EIA 2 
Residual Fuel Oil Stocks Million Barrels EIA 2 
Other Petroleum Products Stocks Million Barrels EIA 2 
Total Petroleum Stocks Million Barrels EIA 2 
Primary Energy Consumed by the 
Residential Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Energy Consumed by the 
Residential Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Primary Energy Consumed by the 
Commercial Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Energy Consumed by the 
Commercial Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Primary Energy Consumed by the 
Industrial Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Energy Consumed by the 
Industrial Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Primary Energy Consumed by the 
Transportation Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Total Energy Consumed by the 
Transportation Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Primary Energy Consumed by the 
Electric Power Sector 
Trillion Btu EIA 2 
Energy Consumption Balancing Item Trillion Btu EIA 0 
Primary Energy Consumption Total Trillion Btu EIA 2 
EIA: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015a) 
DS: Datastream (2015) 
FRED: FRED Database Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Research (2015) 
a
Corresponds to the following transformation: 
0: Levels 
1: Natural Logarithm 
2: First Difference of Natural Logarithm  
3: First Difference of Levels 
 
